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1595 
SURVEILLANCE POLICY MAKING BY PROCUREMENT 
Catherine Crump* 
Abstract: In Seattle, the police obtained a surveillance drone with the approval of a city 
council that did not realize what it was doing. In Oakland, following a council review that 
lasted literally two minutes, the city created a data integration center that networked together 
all of its existing surveillance infrastructure. In San Diego, elected representatives were only 
dimly aware that the law enforcement agency they supervised had built and deployed 
innovative facial recognition technology. 
In an age of heightened concern about the militarization of local police and surveillance 
technology, how do local law enforcement agencies obtain cutting edge and potentially 
intrusive surveillance equipment without elected leaders and the general public realizing it? 
The answer lies in the process of federal procurement, through which the federal 
government, often in the name of combatting terrorism, funnels billions of dollars to local 
law enforcement agencies that can then be used to purchase surveillance equipment. But the 
federal government does not take steps to ensure that local elected representatives and 
members of the public are involved in decisions about what technologies to acquire, or that 
anyone develops a protocol to constrain how the technologies are used. Surveillance policy 
making by procurement thus raises a host of questions about accountability for policy 
choices when the federal government influences local policing through grants, but does not 
address all relevant concerns and how to deal with the inevitable spillover effects of the 
federal government’s national security initiatives on the ways local law enforcement agents 
carry out their more routine policing functions. 
This Article is the first to comprehensively consider the intersection of procurement and 
local surveillance policy making. Using case studies from Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego, it 
exposes the practice of surveillance policy making by procurement. The case studies 
highlight the structural and institutional factors that lead to surveillance policy making by 
procurement, and elected representatives’ responses to it point the way towards policy 
solutions that would bring a greater measure of transparency and accountability to local 
surveillance policy making. The case studies also provide fodder for thinking through the 
way federal spending programs can generate confusion over who is responsible for policy 
                                                     
*Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Thanks to 
Ty Alper, Derek E. Bambauer, Jane Bambauer, Eric Biber, Allie Bohm, Matthew Cagle, Donna 
Crump, Frank Crump, James X. Dempsey, Malcolm M. Feeley, Susan Freiwald, Barry Friedman, 
Jared Friend, Mark P. Gergen, Naomi Gilens, Katie Haas, Brian Hofer, Sonia Katyal, Christina 
Koningisor, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Pamela Samuelson, Jonathan Simon, Jay 
Stanley, Kerry Tremain, Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Charles D. Weisselberg, John Yoo, and 
Franklin E. Zimring for helpful comments. For excellent research assistance, thanks especially to 
Max de la Cal, as well as Waqas Akmal, Olivia Layug Balbarin, J. William Binkley, Caleb Braley, 
Raphaella Friedman, Vanessa Ing, David Schlussel, Monsura Sirajee, and Haejin Song. Thanks also 
to participants of the Internet Law Works in Progress conference, Berkeley Law Faculty Workshop 
and Junior Working Ideas Group, and the Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop for their 
suggestions. Finally, thanks to the Berkeley Law librarians, and to the staff of the Washington Law 
Review for excellent editorial assistance. 
08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:52 PM 
1596 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1595 
 
choices and how the federal government’s national security policies have spillover effects on 
the conduct of routine policing. 
Local communities vary greatly in their crime rates, the competence and trustworthiness 
of their police departments, and their political convictions. This Article draws on the case 
studies to suggest that local governments have a valuable role to play in tailoring surveillance 
policy to local conditions. It concludes by proposing politically feasible steps to strengthen 
local democratic input regarding what surveillance technology should be adopted and the 
conditions under which it should be deployed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One day some of us showed up [to] committee and there were 
some objects on [the] table. It turns out they were drones. We 
didn’t even know we owned drones. We looked at each other 
[and asked], where did these come from? And then someone 
said, oh, you approved it two years ago.1 
—Seattle City Council Member Nick Licata 
 
The heavily militarized response to those protesting the police 
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri generated real shock 
among members of the public, who did not realize that the federal 
government provided military-grade weapons and equipment to local 
law enforcement agencies. In the aftermath, the White House conducted 
a top-to-bottom review of federal support for local law enforcement 
equipment acquisition.2 It concluded that “training has not been 
institutionalized, specifically with respect to civil rights and civil 
liberties protections[.]”3 It also found that “[l]ocal elected officials are 
frequently not involved in the decision-making” about what technology 
their police forces acquire, and the general public is “unaware of what 
their [law enforcement agencies] possess.”4 
                                                     
1. Seattle City Council, Full Council, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 1:07:25 (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/full-council?videoid=x22150 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of councilmember Nick Licata). 
2. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YCV2-TXN7] (reviewing federal funding and programs that provide equipment to 
state and local law enforcement agencies); Mark Landler, Obama Offers New Standards on Police 
Gear in Wake of Ferguson Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-police-use-of-military-gear.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6HXL-QL7A] (describing administration response to public disapproval of federal 
programs viewed as promoting militarization of police). 
3. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 2. 
4. Id. at 4. 
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These statements are equally true of federal programs promoting the 
acquisition of surveillance equipment. The primary difference is that 
while the public does eventually witness the use of force, surveillance, 
by its nature, remains largely invisible. Yet surveillance equipment is 
also susceptible to abuse. The federal government’s role in promoting its 
use merits close attention. This Article begins that work. 
Federal agencies make considerable funds available to local law 
enforcement agencies, in the form of grants, to acquire surveillance 
technologies. Congress substantially increased the amount of funding 
available in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, reflecting the view that 
local cooperation was essential to prevent future incidents of terrorism.5 
Its interest in enhancing the capabilities of local law enforcement 
agencies is likely to increase because anti-terrorism experts are 
convinced that Orlando and San Bernardino-style “home-grown” 
terrorist incidents are now a substantial threat to our security and safety.6 
By influencing the process of procurement, the federal government 
can entice local police departments—over which it has no formal 
control—to enhance their surveillance capabilities in line with federal 
priorities. But this approach, which this Article refers to as surveillance 
policy making by procurement, has a variety of additional consequences. 
For the most part, local law enforcement agencies are directed and 
controlled by locally elected government officials, who are in turn 
subject to the pressures of local public opinion. Surveillance policy 
making by procurement can short-circuit this process when elected 
officials and the public are left without a meaningful understanding of 
what technologies their law enforcement agency is acquiring. This can 
create a governance void, in which law enforcement agencies deploy 
powerful surveillance technologies in ways that may conflict with local 
political preferences. Moreover, because the same surveillance 
technologies that are useful in investigating terrorism are also useful in 
investigating more routine forms of criminal conduct, federal programs 
created with the War on Terror in mind can have significant effects on 
standard law enforcement work. 
                                                     
5. See infra Part II.  
6. According to Matthew G. Olsen, former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the 
Boston Marathon bombing highlighted the “danger posed by lone actors and insular groups not 
directly tied to terrorist organizations, as well as the difficulty of identifying these types of plots 
before they take place.” Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 
The Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. Response, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Matthew 
G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center). 
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To better understand surveillance policy making by procurement, this 
Article develops three case studies: Seattle’s acquisition of a drone and 
deployment of a “mesh network”; Oakland’s construction of a “domain 
awareness center”; and San Diego’s rollout of facial recognition 
technology. The technologies that Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego 
acquired are not marginal improvements on existing tools.7 All 
substantially increase the capacity of a law enforcement agency to 
collect, store, analyze, and share information about individuals, with a 
potentially significant, negative impact on privacy. Using a drone, a law 
enforcement agent can conduct aerial surveillance of an area as soon as 
it becomes of interest. A mesh network—a wireless infrastructure that 
connects cameras and other devices—has the potential to significantly 
increase video surveillance of public places and to track anyone carrying 
a wi-fi-enabled device. Integrating sensor data into a domain awareness 
center—a hub that integrates surveillance data from cameras and other 
networked sensors—raises the prospect of substantially expanding the 
analysis and sharing of data initially collected for different purposes. 
Facial recognition technology has the potential to allow any officer with 
a smartphone to snap a photo of another person and ascertain that 
person’s identity, which is key to accessing a wealth of other 
information, such as criminal history and threat assessment score. 
This Article draws on available public information to demonstrate 
that the phenomenon of surveillance policy making by procurement is 
widespread and merits attention. It is the first piece of legal scholarship 
to focus on the impact of federal procurement programs on local 
surveillance policy making.8 The Article focuses on salient examples, 
but the quantity of federal funding available suggests its broader 
importance. 
Part I explains the scope of the federal government’s involvement in 
local law enforcement agencies’ procurement of surveillance 
technology. The Part both documents the billions of dollars of federal 
funding available to local law enforcement agencies to purchase 
surveillance technologies and builds on the scholarship of others to 
demonstrate the already substantial, and likely expanding, interest of the 
                                                     
7. There is wide recognition that digital technology has vastly expanded the capacity for the 
collection, retention, analysis, and sharing of data. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment 
as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (“Technology has made it easier than 
ever to collect, combine, share, and retain massive amounts of data and to search the resulting 
datasets.”). 
8. Taking a broader view, Rachel A. Harmon has addressed the distortions federal funding 
programs can create in conducting cost-benefit analyses of local policing programs. See Rachel A. 
Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2015). 
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federal government in enhancing the capabilities of local law 
enforcement agencies. Part II introduces the three case studies—Seattle, 
Oakland, and San Diego—that provide more detailed accounts of 
surveillance policy making by procurement. These case studies 
demonstrate the structural and institutional factors that contribute to 
surveillance policy making by procurement as well as its consequences 
for local governance of police surveillance. The policy changes local 
elected officials implemented in the three case studies point the way 
toward reforms that bring local surveillance policy in line with local 
crime conditions, the competence and trustworthiness of the police 
department, and local political preferences. 
Part III takes a theoretical turn. It identifies factors that should be 
considered when optimizing surveillance policy. While there is no one-
size-fits-all solution to how a surveillance technology should be utilized, 
every surveillance scheme raises the same basic questions about how 
data is collected, retained, used, and shared. The absence of a technology 
use policy that hits these basic points—and especially the failure to draft 
any policy at all—should be cause for concern. 
The Part then draws on two bodies of scholarship to explore aspects 
of accountability for local surveillance policy choices. In the case 
studies, federal involvement weakened local democratic control over 
local surveillance policy without offering any replacement. The Supreme 
Court has privileged federal interventions in the form of conditional 
grants-in-aid, such as those in the case studies, over federal interventions 
that commandeer state and local officials precisely because of its view 
that spending programs do a better job of preserving clear lines of 
accountability. But the case studies show that federal spending programs 
can generate considerable confusion over who is responsible for policy 
choices and provide reason to question the factual basis of the distinction 
the Court has drawn. Next, the Part situates the case studies within the 
federal government’s broader efforts to work more closely with local 
law enforcement agencies to prevent, investigate, and respond to acts of 
terror. Particularly, given the dual-purpose nature of much surveillance 
technology, these initiatives have significant impacts not just on 
combatting terrorism but also on how local officers conduct routine 
policing. This suggests that any cost-benefit analysis of the federal 
government’s national security programs should consider not only their 
impact on national security, but also their impact on law enforcement, 
including on transparency and accountability. 
Finally, Part IV makes the case that local elected officials’ familiarity 
with local circumstances positions them particularly well to set local 
surveillance policy. It sets out some policy proposals for enhancing local 
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input over surveillance choices and ensuring that the use of surveillance 
technology is governed by policies that take into account bedrock data 
management principles. This menu of reform options includes actions at 
the federal, state, and local levels. These actions would bring an 
increased measure of local democratic decision making to local 
surveillance policy. 
I.  FEDERAL FUNDING OF LOCAL SURVEILLANCE 
In her scholarship on policing and its regulation, Rachel Harmon has 
observed that federal support for local law enforcement in the form of 
money, equipment, personnel, and power “is far more extensive than its 
civil rights enforcement and has an enormous and understudied impact 
on policing.”9 The response to the events of 9/11 extended this support 
even further. As national security scholar Matthew Waxman explained, 
“[o]nce a major component of the national security threat was seen as 
residing or operating within U.S. borders, local police agencies were an 
obvious resource for the federal government to turn to given the vastness 
of the intelligence challenge.”10 
After 9/11, the federal government established or expanded a number 
of programs to provide equipment and training to help state and local 
law enforcement agencies.11 A quick tally of just the most major federal 
programs indicates that they have made tens of billions of dollars 
                                                     
9. Id. at 872.  
10. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
289, 305 (2012); see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
DOMESTIC FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION: THROUGH THE LENS OF THE SOUTHWEST 
BORDER 16 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf [http://perma.cc/G5QU-
WVM2] (identifying “a broad recognition that state and local law enforcement and public safety 
agencies play significant roles in homeland security—especially stopping terrorist plots.”). For 
example, the federal government significantly expanded the number of joint terrorism taskforces 
around the country. Of the 104 such taskforces that bring together federal and local law enforcement 
personnel to investigate terrorism, 71 were created after September 11, 2001. See Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/5MGD-NUZS]. Also, the federal government has funded the establishment of a 
network of information fusion centers to serve as “focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, 
and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, 
territorial [] and private sector partners.” State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (June 16, 2016), http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers 
[https://perma.cc/J6TV-2FHL]. 
11. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 2 (“Particularly in the years since 
September 11, 2001, Congress and the Executive Branch have steadily increased spending and 
support for [equipment for state and local law enforcement agencies], in light of legitimate concerns 
about the growing threat of terrorism, shrinking local budgets, and the relative ease with which 
some criminals are able to obtain high-powered weapons.”). 
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available for this purpose. It is challenging to understand the impact of 
this funding on local surveillance practices because few programs collect 
statistics on how funding is distributed across categories of equipment 
(e.g., surveillance, weaponry) and training. However, the sheer quantity 
of money suggests these programs’ importance. 
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
administers a substantial number of programs that give grants to law 
enforcement agencies: 
The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) provides support to 
state governments and agencies for planning, organizing, equipping, 
training, and exercising capabilities and procedures to “prevent, protect 
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from” terrorist and other 
threats.12 Between fiscal years 2003 and 2014, the program awarded 
$9.9 billion in grant funds.13 
The Urban Areas Security Initiative has similar goals to the SHSP, 
but focuses on the needs of “high-threat, high-density Urban Areas[.]”14 
Between fiscal years 2003 and 2014, the program awarded $8.4 billion 
in grant funds.15 
The Port Security Grant Program, available to 360 ports, has 
distributed nearly $2.9 billion since its inception in January 2002.16 
Operation Stonegarden, dedicated to border security,17 has disbursed 
$361 million between 2008 and 2014.18 
In addition to DHS programs, the Department of Justice (DOJ) also 
administers grants to state and local governments. For example, its 
Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program is the biggest source of federal 
                                                     
12. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY 
GRANT PROGRAM 4 (2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395161200285-5b07ed0456 
056217175fbdee28d2b06e/FY_2014_HSGP_FOA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FL-MYM8] 
[hereinafter HSGP FOA]. 
13.  Catherine Crump, Statistical Compendium, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2633/ 
[perma.cc/AE42-HXYK].  
14. HSGP FOA, supra note 12, at 4. 
15. Crump, supra note 13.  
16. See id. (outlining calculations and sources underlying figure). 
17. HSGP FOA, supra note 12, at 4. 
18. Crump, supra note 13. 
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justice funding to state and local jurisdictions.19 The program granted a 
total of nearly $3.8 billion between 2003 and 2014.20 
How are state and local law enforcement agencies using these funds 
for surveillance? Again, information is incomplete, but accounts of the 
JAG program, one of the few that releases information on equipment 
purchased with its grants, indicated that in the 2012 program year, 113 
state and local governments used JAG funds to purchase license plate 
readers, 371 purchased video observation equipment, 284 purchased 
undercover surveillance equipment, and 619 purchased on-car or body-
worn cameras.21 
Lists of equipment eligible for purchase under various grants offer 
additional clues about how federal money is spent. The DHS federally 
authorized equipment list, which sets out what local law enforcement 
agencies are authorized to purchase under a broad range of grant 
programs, includes a wide array of “[s]urveillance equipment and related 
accessories,” including audio, data, and visual equipment.22 It 
specifically mentions: (1) equipment for surveillance of telephone 
communications; (2) devices to extract data from cell phones; (3) 
cameras; and (4) infrared illumination equipment.23 
As mentioned previously, although the federal government has 
provided incentives for the expanded use of surveillance equipment by 
local law enforcement agencies, it has not offered any systematic 
guidance on the appropriate uses of this technology, and federal 
programs generally have not required that local elected officials decide 
on surveillance technology acquisitions.24 For example, in the case 
studies that follow, localities obtained funds from two DHS programs, 
the Urban Areas Security Initiative and the Port Security Grant Program, 
                                                     
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EDWARD BYRNE JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2016),  
 https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAG_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RJ-BYH7].  
20. Crump, supra note 13. In addition to the DHS and DOJ, the U.S. Department of Defense also 
works to disseminate surveillance equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies. For 
example, as of December 2014 there were 44,275 of its night vision goggles in the possession of 
local law enforcement agencies. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 8. 
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, GRANT ACTIVITY REPORT, JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM (APRIL 2012 – MARCH 2013) 4 (2013), https://www.bja.gov/ 
Publications/JAG_LE_Grant_Activity_03-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM4E-BS2B]. 
22. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DHS AUTHORIZED 
EQUIPMENT LIST 121 (2012), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1825-25045-
7138/fema_preparedness_grants_authorized_equipment_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT27-FFF5]. 
23. Id. 
24. See supra Introduction. 
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and one DOJ grant program, designed to facilitate information-led 
policing.25 None of the statutes or regulations governing these programs 
require the involvement of local elected officials.26 
II.  MUNICIPAL SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
ACQUISITION: THREE CASE STUDIES 
This Part develops a detailed account of surveillance policy making 
by procurement through the examination of three case studies: Seattle’s 
acquisition of a drone and construction of a mesh network, Oakland’s 
construction of a domain awareness center, and San Diego’s 
development of facial recognition technology. The case studies suggest 
some of the structural and institutional factors that lead local police 
departments to acquire surveillance technologies without participation 
by elected representatives or the general public. The policy solutions 
local elected representatives have devised also serve as a starting point 
for consideration of how to bring a greater measure of local control, 
transparency, and accountability to local surveillance policy. Moreover, 
the case studies provide concrete illustrations of how federal spending 
programs can generate considerable confusion over who is responsible 
for policy choices and how federal programs with the purpose of 
enhancing national security can have their biggest impact on more 
routine policing practices. 
A word about case selection is advisable. The case studies of Seattle, 
Oakland, and San Diego were chosen because a substantial amount of 
information is available about them, which is not often true when the 
topic under consideration is surveillance technology acquisition. In each 
case, a media entity or a non-profit organization uncovered an instance 
                                                     
25. See infra section II.A (describing Seattle’s receipt of funding from the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative and Port Security Grant Program); section II.B (describing Oakland’s receipt of funding 
from the Port Security Grant Program); section II.C (describing San Diego’s receipt of funding from 
an information-led policing grant). 
26. Urban Areas Security Initiative, 6 U.S.C. § 604 (2012); 46 U.S.C. § 70107 (2012) (statute 
governing port security grants); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.318–200.326 (regulations applicable to 
procurement by non-federal entities that are not states). See also Memorandum from Bryan E. 
Kamoie, Assistant Adm’r for Grant Programs, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, to All State 
Administrative Agency Head et al. (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1419366341862-296dd0cc30bbf64a6b45581afe9d8b17/InformationBulletin400 2CFRPart200 
_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/SJS2-ZAAX] (stating that the Urban Areas Security Initiative and Port 
Security Grant Program are governed by the regulations contained at 2 C.F.R. § 200); Letter from 
Michael L. Alston, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, to Pamela Scanlon, Doctor, Automated Reg’l 
Justice Info. Sys., 1 (Sept. 13, 2007), https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/01_-_tacids_award 
Z_letter_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PVX-DUSL] (describing the sources of authority supporting the 
grant funds).  
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where a law enforcement agency acquired a surveillance technology 
without consulting members of the public or elected representatives. 
And in each case, consistent media coverage, the availability of public 
records, or a combination of the two meant there was adequate 
information to examine how members of the public and elected 
representatives responded. 
Given this selection methodology, the case studies cannot be used to 
draw causal inferences regarding surveillance policy making by 
procurement.27 They are nonetheless adequate to the task of this Article, 
which is to identify structural and institutional features that characterize 
policy making by procurement. To the extent that other municipalities 
have similar features, the case studies suggest that an examination of 
whether surveillance policy making by procurement is occurring may be 
warranted. 
A.  Seattle Acquires a Drone and a Mesh Network 
In 2013, the Seattle City Council passed an ordinance, the first of its 
kind, requiring city agencies to obtain council approval prior to 
deploying surveillance technology and to accompany such requests for 
approval with a specific proposal for how data would be collected, 
retained, used, and shared. This was prompted by a strong, negative 
public reaction to the police department’s secret acquisition of two 
federally funded surveillance technologies: a surveillance drone28 and a 
mesh network.29 The public response to both technologies was so 
negative, strongly felt, and sustained that the mayor at the time acceded 
to the opposition and terminated the programs.30 This was not the first 
                                                     
27. See generally GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY 56 (1994) (describing as a fundamental goal of descriptive inference “to distinguish the 
systematic component from the nonsystematic component of the phenomena we study”); id. at 75–
76 (distinguishing descriptive inference from causal inference).  
28. Christine Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 8:45 PM) http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/2020260670_waterfrontcamera 
sxml.html [https://perma.cc/ZV47-LBML]. 
29. A wireless mesh network is a wireless network consisting of multiple nodes that relay data. 
See, e.g., Mesh Networking, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mesh_networking [https:// 
perma.cc/H2KP-7N5G]. The network was to be spread throughout downtown Seattle, and was to 
have a variety of functions, including facilitating data transmission from thirty new surveillance 
cameras. See Christine Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at Seattle Police Gathering to Explain 
Intended Use of Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct 25, 2012, 10:54 PM), http://www. 
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-steal-the-show-at-seattle-police-gathering-to-explain-
intended-use-of-drones/ [https://perma.cc/LP6N-JS2Z].  
30. See Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2013, 9:33 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddronesxml.html [https:// 
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time the Seattle Police Department’s surveillance initiatives became 
embroiled in controversy. Several years earlier, the police department 
installed surveillance cameras in public parks, without the consent of the 
council, by finding an alternate source of funding after the council 
refused to provide funding.31 The secretive manner in which the police 
acquired the surveillance technologies contributed to public opposition 
and may well have undermined some valuable programs that could have 
been implemented in a less contentious environment.32 
1.  History of Police Surveillance in Seattle 
In 2008, the police department activated three cameras in Seattle’s 
Cal Anderson Park, a sizeable urban park in the city’s Capitol Hill 
neighborhood.33 The city council had prohibited certain funding sources 
from being used to finance cameras.34 But because it did not technically 
prohibit surveillance cameras in parks, the police department found other 
funding to install the cameras, and did so, ultimately without informing 
the city council.35 It did not take long for members of the public to spot 
the cameras and start asking questions. When council members realized 
they had been circumvented, they were upset both with the lack of 
transparency and the department’s failure to address basic data 
management issues, such as how long video footage would be kept and 
how it would be used.36 
                                                     
perma.cc/6XV7-RP3A]; Jon Humbert, City Leaders Raising Questions About Seattle Surveillance 
Plan, KOMO NEWS (Feb. 14. 2013), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/City-leaders-raising-
questions-about-Seattle-surveillance-plan-191352151.html [https://perma.cc/VW6F-WRGY].  
31. See Bob Young, Surveillance Cameras Installed in Seattle’s Cal Anderson Park, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2008) http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/surveillance-cameras-installed-in-
seattles-cal-anderson-park/ [https://perma.cc/2H54-CCS6]. 
32. See id. During this time, tensions between the police and residents were already high. In 2011, 
the DOJ announced an investigation of the Seattle Police Department. Complaint ¶ 19, United 
States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd_complaint_7-27-12.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7A4E-UAFY]. It did so after several widely publicized instances of police officers 
allegedly using excessive force against individuals, especially minorities and persons with 
disabilities. Id. at ¶ 18. The DOJ found that the police department routinely used excessive force and 
followed policing practices that could lead to discriminatory policing. Letter from Thomas E. Perex, 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., and Jenny A. Durkan, United States Attorney, W. Dist. 
of Wash., to Michel McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle 3 (Dec. 16, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9GF4-8ASB]. 
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Despite this rocky start, the Seattle city council went along with a 
proposal to install cameras in three additional parks for a twenty-one-
month period to test whether the cameras would have a meaningful 
impact on crime.37 After a city auditor concluded that there was no 
evidence that the cameras had reduced crime, the council ordered them 
removed.38 
This experience made city council members particularly skeptical 
when, a few years later, the police department’s acquisition of a drone 
and a mesh camera network came before them for oversight. 
2.  The Drone and Mesh Network Controversies 
In 2010, the Seattle Police Department acquired a surveillance 
drone.39 The drone was essentially a remote-controlled, miniature 
helicopter that weighed just over two pounds and could remain airborne 
for about ten minutes while live-streaming footage to law enforcement 
agents.40 While it could zoom in on a subject, its magnification was 
about as powerful as that of a standard point-and-click camera.41 It was 
also quite loud, precluding the possibility of surreptitious surveillance.42 
It is hard to see this particular drone as a civil liberties threat or as a 
significant benefit to law enforcement. Given its limited range and 
                                                     
37. Sharon Pian Chan, 3 More Seattle Parks to Get Security Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (June 10, 
2008) http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/3-more-seattle-parks-to-get-security-cameras/ 
[https://perma.cc/97CH-KAXP]. The city spent approximately $406,000 installing the cameras. Id. 
Subsequent budget cuts ultimately made it impossible to maintain the cameras in all but Cal 
Anderson Park. Lauren Padgett, Seattle to Take New Look at Cal Anderson Surveillance Cameras, 
CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:11 PM), http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/ 
2010/03/seattle-to-take-new-look-at-cal-anderson-surveillance-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/ZY43-
VMNX]. 
38. Timetable Set for Cal Anderson Cam Removal: Surveillance Tech to be Redeployed, CAPITOL 
HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2010/ 
09/timetable-set-for-cal-anderson-cam-removal-surveillance-tech-to-be-redeployed/ [https://perma. 
cc/MT62-5ETA]. 
39. See Lynn Thompson, Police Apologize for Not Keeping Council in Loop on New Drones, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/police-apologize-for-not-
keeping-council-in-loop-on-new-drones/ [https://perma.cc/7RVQ-2T8P]; PUB. SAFETY, CIVIL 
RIGHTS & TECH. COMM., CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT UNMANNED AERIAL 
SYSTEMS 3 (2012), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/meetingrecords/2012/  
pscrt20120502_1a.pdf [http://perma.cc/J2DA-WYC6]; Memorandum from John Diaz, Chief, 
Seattle Police Dep’t, to Sally Clark, President, Seattle City Council, and Seattle City Council 
Comm. on Pub. Safety, Civil Rights & Tech. 1 (May 1, 2012) (on file with author). 
40. Thompson, supra note 39; CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 39, at 4. 
41. See CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 39, at 4. 
42. See id. 
08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:52 PM 
1608 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1595 
 
capabilities, it has more in common with toy drones currently available 
commercially for a few hundred dollars than with its military brethren. 
The department purchased the drone with some $82,500 of federal 
money, funds that comprised a small sliver of a 2008 grant from the 
DHS.43 The grant came from the Urban Areas Security Initiative, which, 
as discussed earlier, is devoted to helping high-density, high-threat urban 
areas prevent and recover from acts of terror.44 The city council had 
authorized the police chief to accept about $3.6 million to “provide 
training for Seattle’s first responders to further enhance their ability to 
respond to, and aid in the recovery from, threats or acts of terrorism.”45 
It did not mention acquiring a drone. 
City council members found out about the drone in the same way as 
everyone else: from the media. In January 2012, a San Francisco-based 
advocacy organization, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), sued 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain records regarding 
drone flights in the United States.46 When the FAA disclosed a list of 
authorized drone users a few months later, the Seattle Police Department 
was on the list.47 Media outlets covered the department’s acquisition of 
the drone prominently.48 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
                                                     
43. Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39, at 1; Memorandum from Christa Valles, 




45. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 122886 (2008), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Ordinances/ 
Ord_122886.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3KM-QUM6] (approving receipt of fiscal year 2008 UASI 
funds); Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that drones were purchased with 
funds authorized pursuant to Ordinance 122886). 
46. See Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG 
(Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you [http://perma.cc/ 
RJP3-MD2F]. Lynch filed many of the public records act requests discussed in this Article, 
demonstrating the ability of one person making good strategic use of open records laws to bring 
meaningful increased transparency to a policy arena. 
47. See Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left 
Unanswered, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-
questions-unanswered [http://perma.cc/YVC5-DHUD]; FAA LIST OF CERTIFICATES OF 
AUTHORIZATIONS (COAS), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/20120416 
_faa_drones_coa_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/8V9S-8P52]. 
48. See, e.g., Christine Clarridge, Eye-in-Sky SPD Drones Stir Privacy Concerns, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/eye-in-sky-spd-drones-stir-
privacy-concerns/ [http://perma.cc/699P-NHNM]; Somini Sengupta, Lawmakers Set Limits on 
Police in Using Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2013, at A1. Interestingly, this was not the first time 
the media had covered acquisition of the drones, but prior stories appear to have gone unnoticed. 
According to the city council testimony of Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh, the police department 
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of Washington did not condemn acquisition of the drone, but did call for 
regulations for its use.49 Seattle’s leading newspaper called for “formal 
oversight” of the drone to prevent encroachments on civil liberties.50 
The Seattle Police Department defended its acquisition of the drone.51 
The police chief downplayed any policy implications, describing the 
drone as “merely an expansion of the daily task of patrol officers to 
collect all information necessary to safely and effectively respond to 
calls for service and accomplish law enforcement goals.”52 The police 
chief agreed to develop a policy for permissible uses for the drone, but 
made no mention of running the policy by the city council.53 
Some city council members expressed exasperation that they had not 
been told about the drone in advance.54 They were also frustrated by the 
police department’s failure to identify a role for the city council in 
approving a use policy, which prompted one council member to suggest 
that police “have more of a dialogue with the council, because we are the 
ones that . . . approve funding decisions and we want to make 
sure . . . that you are hearing everything that we hear as well.”55 This 
was a reminder that the city council controls the police department’s 
overall budget and can choose to approve or disapprove purchases on an 
item-by-item basis. It was also an implicit suggestion that it would be 
                                                     
had done two pieces on the drones about a year prior. Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil 
Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 38:55 (May 2, 2012) 
http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/20122013-public-safety-civil-rights-
and-technology-committee/?videoid=x23397 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of Assistant 
Chief Paul McDonagh); see, e.g., Johnathon Fitzpatrick, Did You Know Seattle Police Have a 
Flying Surveillance Drone?, SEATTLE WKLY. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.seattleweekly.com/home/ 
936836-129/technology [https://perma.cc/6SQ6-TZ46 ] (one of the earlier stories on the drones). 
49. Clarridge, supra note 48. 
50. Aerial Drones Are Law-Enforcement Tools That Need Formal Oversight, SEATTLE TIMES 
(May 6, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2018143433_edit07drone.html [https://perma. 
cc/95U2-JSJ4]. 
51. Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39. 
52. Id. at 4. 
53. Id. at 3. 
54. Thompson, supra note 39. As councilmember Mike O’Brien put it,  
when we have cameras flying around and significant costs and I think to some eyes, is it a toy 
or is it a useful tool is a question that we’re always considering, I think we’re in a little bit of a 
tough place and I think the best thing is to bring us along and to make sure we’re working 
really closely with partners, especially anything with a camera in it to get to a place where 
we’re going to all be comfortable with it. 
Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 58:00 (statement of Mike O’Brien, Vice Chair, Public Safety, 
Civil Rights and Technology Committee).  
55. Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 55:00 (statement of Bruce Harrell, Chair, Public 
Safety, Civil Rights and Technology).  
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wise for the police department to cooperate with the city council by 
involving it in key decisions. 
The police department mounted a public relations campaign to 
convince the public of the good the drone would do, but it was too little, 
too late. The local ACLU affiliate was willing to go along with a regime 
that involved the regulated use of drones, but others outflanked it by 
demanding that the police get rid of the drone. When the police hosted 
an open house to display the drone and answer questions, members of 
the public hurled insults at them.56 The police department also invited 
the public to contribute to a draft policy for the use of drones.57 After 
some members of the public asserted that a use policy was inadequate 
because the police department would be free to amend it at any time,58 a 
council member proposed a draft ordinance setting legally binding limits 
on police use of drones.59 The city council hearing at which the 
ordinance was first discussed likewise drew heated public opposition to 
the idea of using drones at all.60 In addition, some objected to the 
process, driven by the availability of federal funds, which led to the 
drone’s acquisition.61 
                                                     
56. See Christine Clarridge, Police Display Drones They Hope to Deploy, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 
24, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-police-display-drones-they-
hope-to-deploy/ [https://perma.cc/8VS4-SGFX]; Christine Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at 
Seattle Police Gathering to Explain Intended Use of Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct 25, 2012, 10:54 
PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-steal-the-show-at-seattle-police-gathering 
-to-explain-intended-use-of-drones/ [https://perma.cc/LP6N-JS2Z]; Jake Ellison, Drones Get Really 
Tiny; New Rules Proposed for Seattle Police, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, (Feb. 6, 2013, 3:48 
PM) http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Drones-get-really-tiny-Seattle-council-may-make-
4250452.php [https://perma.cc/D7HD-C9UW]; Brendan Kiley, Last Night’s Police Drone 
“Demonstration” Turned into Another Kind of Demonstration, THE STRANGER: SLOG (Oct. 26, 
2012, 10:17 AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/10/26/last-nights-police-drone-
demonstration-turned-into-another-kind-of-demonstration [https://perma.cc/A4PC-J5JU]. 
57. Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at Seattle Police Gathering to Explain Intended Use of 
Drones, supra note 56. 
58. Christine Clarridge, Use of Police Drones by Seattle Police Strikes a Nerve, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2012, 6:34 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/use-of-drones-by-seattle-police-
strikes-a-nerve/ [https://perma.cc/8SMN-4DUZ].  
59. Jake Ellison, supra note 56. 
60. Christine Clarridge, Heated Hearing Airs Distrust over SPD Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2013, 3:03 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/heated-hearing-airs-distrust-over-spd-
drones/ [https://perma.cc/Z2AW-95EB]. 
61. As Jennifer Shaw, Deputy Director of the Washington State American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) put it,  
[w]e really are concerned that our police department has jumped on this bandwagon that other 
departments across the country have jumped on, which is to follow federal money instead of 
having the city leaders, the elected officials, and the civilian leaders, be the ones to decide the 
directions and the use of the technology that comes into the department. 
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Despite efforts by the police department and some city council 
members to save the drone, the mayor stepped in and terminated the 
program. He explained that it had become a distraction from more 
pressing law enforcement priorities.62 In 2014, Seattle donated the drone 
to Los Angeles,63 where it also provoked such strenuous public 
opposition that it was never flown.64 
The drone was one of two surveillance controversies in Seattle that 
unfolded in quick succession. Around the same time, members of the 
public began to express dismay over a second issue: the deployment of a 
mesh network with surveillance cameras in waterfront neighborhoods.65 
In 2011, the DHS awarded Seattle nearly five million dollars to 
deploy a mesh network.66 The funds came from the Port Security Grant 
Program, which, as the name suggests, works to improve security at 
vulnerable ports.67 The network had many potential capabilities. It 
would allow first responders to communicate even if the cellular 
telephone network was unavailable or overloaded (a well-known 
problem that occurred in New York City on 9/11).68 It would also enable 
                                                     
Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 
2:20 (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/20122013-
public-safety-civil-rights-and-technology-committee/?videoid=x22317 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) 
(statement of Jennifer Shaw, Deputy Director of the Washington state ACLU). The Seattle Times 
editorialized along similar lines, stating that “[i]t was simply bad timing to acquire the drones ahead 
of having established operating procedures and requirements for rigorous performance reviews.” 
Editorial, Seattle Mayor McGinn Right to Ground Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorial-seattle-mayor-mcginn-right-to-ground-drones/ 
[http://perma.cc/KV22-F2NZ]; see also Danny Westneat, Spy Gear Needs Public Scrutiny First, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spy-gear-needs-
public-scrutiny-first/ [https://perma.cc/KV22-F2NZ]. 
62. Clarridge, supra note 30 (“The announcement [to end the drone program] came one day after 
the city held a public hearing on a proposed ordinance outlining restrictions for the . . . program, 
which drew vocal opposition from numerous citizens concerned with intrusions into their 
privacy.”).  
63. Steve Gorman, Los Angeles Police Try to Reassure Public on Newly Acquired Drones, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-usa-drones-
california-idUSKBN0HB2NC20140916 [https://perma.cc/VF7C-69S3]. 
64. Shawn Musgrave, LAPD *Still* Doesn’t Know What to Do With Its Drones, MUCKROCK 
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2015/oct/01/lapd-drones-still-shelf-year-
later/ [https://perma.cc/2X75-RXR2]. 
65. See Clarridge, supra note 28; Christine Clarridge, Police Get the Picture on Seattle’s Spy-
Camera Qualms, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/police-get-the-picture-on-seattlersquos-spy-camera-qualms/ [https://perma.cc/KW9K-9UHL]. 
66. Clarridge, Police Get the Picture on Seattle’s Spy-Camera Qualms, supra note 65.  
67. See supra Part I. 
68. See SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF SEATTLE PORT SECURITY MESH NETWORK 1 
(2015), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/meetingrecords/2013/pscrt20130220_1b.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/J87B-8ZSL]. 
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police to stream video back from their patrol cars to a central monitoring 
station.69 And, fatefully, it would facilitate the deployment of thirty 
surveillance cameras in public places.70 
In May 2012, the police department sought and obtained the 
unanimous approval of the city council to accept the DHS money and 
begin construction of the network.71 Unfortunately, the police 
department’s depiction of the camera network was deeply misleading. 
The department created the strong impression that the cameras would 
focus solely on port facilities and the shoreline—in other words, 
selected, sensitive commercial buildings and the coast—and did not 
mention that they would also be used for surveillance of people in 
residential neighborhoods.72 Written materials described only “strategic 
placement of video cameras monitoring port facilities, ferry terminals, 
and coast lines within the City’s limits.”73 Chris Steel, the police 
department’s grant manager, testified that the cameras would “basically 
keep an eye on the port facilities within the Port of Seattle region.”74 
Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh added that, “[t]he idea here was to 
strategically place cameras, video cameras, around the waterfront area 
that monitor the shoreline and the waterway.”75 
The department’s statements turned out to be true but incomplete. The 
department also placed cameras in parts of downtown where a 
substantial number of people lived, but where there were no port 
facilities to protect. Even some of the department’s strongest supporters 
on the council felt blindsided by this revelation. One such ally, public 
safety committee chair Bruce Harrell, said,  
moving forward on any kind of camera surveillance 
technology . . . , it’s not a twenty questions game, did you ask 
                                                     
69. Matt A. Fikse, Seattle’s New Waterfront Cameras: The Beginning of City-Wide 
Surveillance?, CROSSCUT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://crosscut.com/2013/03/crosscut-investigates-
questions-spd-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/LGW7-69YM]. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.; SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 123879 (May 7, 2012), 
http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~archives/Ordinances/Ord_123879.pdf [http://perma.cc/9JXB-E8M4] 
(approving receipt of funds from U.S. Department of Homeland Security Port Security Grant 
Program). 
72. Letter from Michael McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle, to Sally J. Clark, President, Seattle City 
Council (Mar. 13, 2012), http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~archives/Ordinances/Ord_123879.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KR68-MXUN]. 
73. Id.  
74. Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 1:17:00 (statement of Chris Steel, Grant Manager, 
Seattle Police Department). 
75. Id. at 1:21:00 (statement of Paul McDonagh, East Precinct Commander, Seattle Police 
Department). 
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the right questions . . . . I just expect the department . . . to have 
a heightened sensitivity toward camera issues such that I would 
have liked to have had this conversation when the grants were 
approved.76 
In February 2013, the mayor stated that he did not want the not-yet-
activated mesh network turned on until there was more public 
discussion.77 The coup de grâce for the mesh network came when the 
media reported on yet another undisclosed capability: it could track the 
location of anyone carrying a wi-fi-enabled device.78 This tracking was 
too much coming on the heels of the camera controversy: the mesh 
network was dead. In March 2014, the newly elected mayor, Ed Murray, 
commented that he did not expect the network to be activated for a long 
time, if ever. He further remarked: “This city, it appears, when 
opportunities arise to get money from the feds, we go after the money, 
maybe without thinking through whether we actually want this kind of 
equipment in our city.”79 
Given the cascade of surveillance controversies, some members of the 
city council concluded that the police department’s lack of transparency 
was a systemic problem.80 This led the council to adopt an innovative 
solution: the nation’s first-ever local ordinance requiring city 
departments to seek approval prior to acquiring any surveillance 
equipment. 
                                                     
76. Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE 
CHANNEL, at 1:11:00 (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-
council/20122013-public-safety-civil-rights-and-technology-committee/?videoid=x22257 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of Bruce Harrell, Chair, Public Safety, Civil Rights and 
Technology). 
77. Jon Humbert, City Leaders Raising Questions About Seattle Surveillance Plan, KOMO NEWS 
(Feb. 14. 2013), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/City-leaders-raising-questions-about-
Seattle-surveillance-plan-191352151.html [https://perma.cc/VW6F-WRGY]. 
78. See David Ham, Seattle Police Have a Wireless Network That Can Track Your Every Move, 
KIROTV (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/seattle-police-have-wireless-
network-can-track-you/246051198 [https://perma.cc/ZSB7-72EH] 
 (“Every time a device looks for a Wi-Fi signal and the access point recognizes it, it can store that 
data.”). 
79. Mayor Murray Re: SPD Surveillance Cams, WEST SEATTLE BLOG, at 01:01 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://westseattleblog.com/2014/03/wsb-qa-with-the-mayor-2-will-spds-surveillance-cameras-ever-
be-turned-on/ [https://perma.cc/SD2Q-QFBV]. 
80. See, e.g., Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee, 
SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 1:48:00 (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-
council/city-council/city-council-all-videos-index?videoid=x22186 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) 
(statement of Council President Sally J. Clark); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124142 (2013) 
(“WHEREAS, recent incidents involving the City’s acquisition of drones and the installation of 
video cameras along Seattle’s waterfront and downtown have raised concerns over privacy and the 
lack of public process leading up to the decisions to use certain surveillance equipment . . . .”).  
08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:52 PM 
1614 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1595 
 
The ordinance, which passed unanimously, provides for democratic 
oversight and greater transparency. It obligates any department wishing 
to acquire surveillance equipment to “obtain City Council approval via 
ordinance prior to acquisition.”81 It also forbids city departments from 
installing or deploying such equipment until the council approves an 
operational protocol governing its use.82 The operational protocol must 
specify how the equipment will be used and where it will be located. It 
must provide a description of how the equipment will impact privacy 
and anonymity and how the department will mitigate any risks to 
privacy and anonymity. Further, it must specify how and when data will 
be retained and who will be able to access the data and must contain a 
plan for reaching out to members of the public in communities where 
surveillance equipment will be located.83 In addition to this operational 
protocol, the ordinance obligates the police to submit for approval a 
separate data management protocol relating to the surveillance 
equipment in question, addressing the collection, use, retention, and 
sharing of data it gathers.84 
Although comprehensive in its requirements, the ordinance’s 
definition of “surveillance equipment” contains exceptions that limit the 
scope of its application. The effect of these exceptions is unclear but 
could be significant. Most notably, the ordinance exempts police from 
the requirement to obtain council approval before acquiring surveillance 
equipment that it uses “on a temporary basis for the purpose of a 
criminal investigation supported by reasonable suspicion[.]”85 This 
exemption could cover a vast amount of surveillance activity. If, for 
example, police temporarily installed an automatic license plate reader to 
register all cars coming in and out of a particular parking lot because 
they had reasonable suspicion that prostitution was taking place on the 
premises, this use would appear to be exempt. 
The Seattle surveillance ordinance is now more than two years old, 
and the police department has not returned to the council regarding any 
technology acquisition. It is difficult to know what to make of this 
outcome. Did the negative public and political response, which included 
the ordinance itself, and the prospect of constraints imposed by the 
required protocols lead the police department to avoid the acquisition of 
                                                     
81. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 14.18.20 (2013). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. § 14.18.30. 
85. Id. § 14.18.40. 
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new surveillance technology requiring council approval? If so, does that 
mean surveillance practices have been effectively constrained by the 
ordinance? Or have authorities found they could satisfy their wish to 
obtain additional surveillance using the ordinance’s exceptions? 
Doug Klunder, Privacy Counsel at the Washington ACLU affiliate, 
believes that the ordinance has forestalled the deployment of 
surveillance technology: 
The ordinance has had real value. It is much more likely that the 
mesh network would be up and running now without the 
ordinance. Drafting a vague privacy policy after a quiet period 
of a year or two might well have been enough to overcome 
public opposition to the mesh network. The ordinance’s 
requirement of development of detailed protocols, along with 
council approval, is a greater obstacle that the police department 
seems unwilling to tackle.86 
Klunder also believes that the ordinance, coupled with the 
experiences with the drone and the mesh network, achieved something 
of a cultural shift within the police department. When the Seattle Police 
Department wanted to roll out limited facial recognition capabilities, it 
brought local privacy activists into the conversation at the outset and 
also obtained city council approval, even though facial recognition was 
not covered by the terms of the ordinance (because it is a piece of 
software, not “equipment,” as the ordinance defines it).87 
3.  Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making in Seattle 
The collapse of Seattle’s drone and mesh network surveillance 
initiatives seems to have been the result of the Seattle Police 
Department’s persistent and ultimately self-defeating inability (or 
unwillingness) to bring councilmembers and the public into the decision-
making process at an early stage. Once the technologies (or the full 
extent of their capabilities) were discovered, the public was so upset by 
the department’s secrecy that it proved impossible to have a reasonable 
conversation about the underlying merits of the technology. Federal 
public spending programs contributed to the police department’s 
mishandling of public relations by enabling the department to acquire 
the technologies without obtaining public support. The programs also 
enabled the police department to acquire the technologies without 
                                                     
86. Statement of Doug Klunder, Privacy Counsel, ACLU of Washington (June 25, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
87. Id. 
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addressing their impact on civil rights and liberties. When the 
acquisitions became public, these issues had to be addressed, but it was 
too late to address them in a reasonable manner. 
The Seattle case study also illustrates how the national security 
objectives that drive the federal programs are largely irrelevant at the 
local level. The federal government’s purpose in expending funds 
through its Urban Areas Security Initiative and Port Security Grant 
Program was to combat terrorism. This purpose was lost in the debate in 
Seattle. Instead, residents and council members focused on the 
immediate and tangible effects of the surveillance equipment acquired 
under these programs on day-to-day policing. This outcome is not 
surprising. Surveillance equipment is inherently dual-purpose 
equipment, and terrorism is a relatively small proportion of overall 
crime. 
Finally, the Seattle case study offers a partial path forward in the 
council’s surveillance equipment ordinance. The ordinance ensures early 
public disclosure and an opportunity for public debate. But this solves 
only the problem of nondisclosure. The city council and the public must 
be able to grasp the implications of what they are being told. Our next 
case study, Oakland, shows that this can be a problem. 
B.  Oakland Acquires a Domain Awareness Center 
In 2010, the Oakland City Council granted its police and fire 
departments approval to build a Domain Awareness Center (DAC), 
using federal funds from the Port Security Grant Program, to enhance 
security at Oakland’s port. The DAC aggregated surveillance data 
already being gathered in all corners of the city into a single facility for 
monitoring and analysis. The theory behind this data aggregation was 
that it would improve the ability of port officials to anticipate threats to 
the port while also enhancing the capabilities of Oakland’s police and 
fire departments to detect crime and respond to emergencies. 
The council unanimously approved the DAC, and no members of the 
public objected. It was not to stay that way. In 2013, police and fire 
representatives (whom I refer to as “city staff”) returned to the city 
council to request approval to accept another infusion of federal funds to 
increase the DAC’s capacity, primarily by integrating additional data 
sources. This time, the community response was swift and 
overwhelmingly negative. Given Oakland’s decades-long history of poor 
community-police relations, the DAC’s capabilities far outstripped 
anything the public was willing to entrust to its police department. 
The opposition prompted the city council to pass a resolution limiting 
the geographic scope of the DAC’s surveillance to the immediate port 
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area and then to convene a citizen task force to draft a privacy policy for 
the DAC. A dedicated collection of residents met dozens of times in 
meetings open to the public. They worked collaboratively with city staff 
and crafted a privacy policy acceptable to everyone. The process was so 
successful that the policy passed the city council unanimously, and the 
council also created a standing citizen privacy committee to draft a 
Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinance to apply to all 
government surveillance technology citywide. 
If Seattle demonstrated how a police department could sabotage its 
surveillance initiatives by provoking public anger through excessive 
secrecy, then Oakland illustrates both the limits and promise of greater 
involvement of local elected officials and members of the public. 
Oakland city staff did voluntarily what Seattle officials are now 
compelled by ordinance to do: they came early to the city council and 
were forthcoming with details about their surveillance initiative. Yet 
neither council members nor the general public grasped the significance 
of what they were being told. Once the DAC did become politically 
salient, however, the process by which Oakland devised a privacy policy 
was a model of inclusiveness and collaboration. It resulted in a privacy 
policy that allowed the DAC to go forward and still reflected the 
community’s strongly expressed political preferences. 
1.  History of Police-Community Relations in Oakland 
It is difficult to understand Oakland’s reaction to the DAC without at 
least some understanding of the history of police-community relations in 
Oakland. It is not possible to more than gesture at this history in the 
space available in this Article.88 For present purposes, suffice it to say 
that the people of Oakland have a long and troubled relationship with 
their police force. The Black Panthers got their start organizing armed 
citizens’ patrols to monitor police officers in Oakland89 and became one 
of the FBI’s main targets in its notorious COINTELPRO surveillance 
investigations. COINTELPRO, or “Counterintelligence Program,” was 
an FBI initiative that surveilled and disrupted domestic political and 
social groups. Eventually, Congress condemned the program and the 
                                                     
88. There does not appear to be a single, definitive treatment of policing in Oakland. However, 
for a work that addresses policing in Oakland within the context of broader social and political 
questions, see ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR 
OAKLAND (2003). 
89. Steve Wasserman, Rage and Ruin: On the Black Panthers, THE NATION (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/rage-and-ruin-black-panthers/ [https://perma.cc/3BKF-CNYP]. 
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FBI repudiated it.90 Politically involved people in Oakland, particularly 
older people, still evoke COINTELPRO when arguing for limits on 
surveillance and on the authority of the police more generally.91 
If Oakland’s status as home of the Panthers provides a historical 
backdrop, a more recent example of systematic police abuse further 
shapes citizen-police relationships. In 2000, rookie police officer Keith 
Batt resigned after just ten days on the force. He did so to blow the 
whistle on the conduct of four officers, known as the Riders, who were 
assaulting, planting evidence on, and arresting innocent people in West 
Oakland—at that time a mostly black community.92 
Investigations substantiated Batt’s allegations. Although criminal 
prosecutions of the accused officers was unsuccessful, the police 
department fired the Riders, and a civil suit based on the officers’ abuse 
yielded a $10.9 million settlement for 119 people.93 More importantly, 
the settlement compelled the city to agree to implement a list of fifty-one 
reforms.94 
Nearly a decade later, the city had failed to implement a substantial 
number of these mandated reforms.95 In 2012, U.S. District Court Judge 
Thelton Henderson, frustrated with the non-compliance, threatened to 
put the entire department under federal receivership and ultimately 
                                                     
90. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COINTELPRO, FBI RECORDS: THE VAULT, 
https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro [https://perma.cc/3MPU-9TDM] (“COINTELPRO was later 
rightfully criticized by Congress and the American people for abridging first amendment rights and 
for other reasons.”). 
91. See, e.g., Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency & City Council, CITY 
OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 03:41 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=1462 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (public commenter invoking the Panthers and 
COINTELPRO). 
92. Glenn Chapman, Prosecutor Gives Up ‘Riders’ Case, EAST BAY TIMES (June 3, 2005), 
http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_2777760 [https://perma.cc/LW8D-
B5MA]; Jim Herron Zamora, Spotlight on Police as ‘Riders’ Go on Trial, S.F. GATE (Apr. 29, 
2002), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Spotlight-on-police-as-Riders-go-on-trial-2844728. 
php [https://perma.cc/NES2-LHFD] (“Two years after a band of Oakland police officers known as 
the ‘Riders’ allegedly arrested and roughed up innocent citizens in the biggest scandal to hit the 
department in decades, three of the officers are scheduled to go on trial today as the case ripples 
through the city.”). 
93. D.A. Is Right to Seek Retrial of ‘Riders’ Case, THE ARGUS (Nov. 19, 2003); Chip Johnson, 
Prosecution Fumbled on Riders’ Case / Witnesses Couldn’t Win Credibility, S.F. GATE (Oct. 6, 
2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Prosecution-fumbled-on-Riders-
case-Witnesses-2554318.php [https://perma.cc/5H9J-DMCJ]. 
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approved the appointment of a court-supervised compliance director to 
force progress.96 The compliance director continues his work to this day. 
Although shootings of civilians by Oakland police have dropped 
substantially in recent years, as have civil rights lawsuits against the city, 
the department is still riven by scandal.97 Two years before the DAC 
controversy broke out, Oakland was the home of a major spin-off of the 
Occupy Wall Street movement.98 Occupy Oakland participants 
repeatedly established encampments at various places in Oakland, which 
the police were then called upon to clear out.99 Participants leveled 
charges of excessive use of force against police officers.100 While most 
protesters were peaceful, a small share committed property damage and 
threw objects at police officers.101 In a more recent and particularly 
shocking scandal, over a dozen officers are currently being investigated 
in connection with allegations that they had sex with a teenage 
prostitute, who may have been a minor at the outset of some of the 
sexual relationships.102 
2.  The Controversy over the Domain Awareness Center 
Oakland’s work on the DAC can be traced back at least to 2009. Just 
three days before the submission deadline for that year’s federal Port 
Security Grant Program, city staff submitted an informational 
memorandum to the city council about their collaboration with the Port 
of Oakland on a grant application.103 The city does not appear to have 
thought of the idea of creating a DAC itself. Rather, it seems to have 
                                                     
96.  Demian Bulwa & Carolyn Jones, Oakland Cuts Deal on Cops, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2012, at 
A1; Dan Levine, For Police Reformers, California City Shows a Rough Road, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-oakland-insight-idUSKBN0JS0HL20141214 
[https://perma.cc/WP5G-9H5W]. 
97. Levine, supra note 96. 
98. Occupy Oakland, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_Oakland [https://perma. 
cc/TC8Z-ZTLM].  
99. Id. 
100. Id.; see also Matthai Kuruvila, Justin Berton & Demian Bulwa, Police Tear Gas Occupy 
Oakland Protesters, S.F. GATE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Police-tear-
gas-Occupy-Oakland-protesters-2325544.php#photo-1830498 [https://perma.cc/6KMV-5HPZ]. 
101. Id. 
102. Thomas Fuller, A Young Prostitute, Police Scandals and a Rocky Renaissance in Oakland, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/a-young-prostitute-police-
scandals-and-a-rocky-renaissance-in-oakland.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4PHK-EV4F]. 
103. Memorandum from Dan Lindheim, City Adm’r, City of Oakland, to Pub. Safety Comm., 
City of Oakland, 1–2 (June 23, 2009), http://clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/22406.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WNH2-DAEL]. 
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been a response to the decision of federal grant administrators to 
prioritize funding projects that “reflect ‘robust regional coordination’ 
and an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional security 
strategy integration.”104 
The grant proposed creating a DAC “to consolidate a network of 
existing surveillance and security sensor technologies and data to 
actively monitor critical Port facilities, utility infrastructure, roadways, 
and ultimately establish a citywide system.”105 City staff emphasized that 
“[t]he combination of a maritime monitoring and coordination center 
with the City of Oakland’s [existing] inter-agency, landside monitoring 
and coordination center, [the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)] 
could have great potential and benefits in protecting people and critical 
infrastructure in both the City and the Port area.”106 City staff also 
envisaged the possibility that information sharing might eventually be 
regional in scope: “[T]he Center would provide functionality and a 
location where multiple agencies can access integrated regional 
capabilities and technologies including sensors, platforms, 
communications and information exploitation.”107 
The DAC, on its own, would not collect additional data. Rather, it 
was to be a data integration center, networking together the city’s 
existing surveillance infrastructure. There are a couple of reasons why a 
city might want to do this. First, it makes the data the city is collecting 
more useful (although potentially more privacy-invasive). For example, 
it would enable police officers, within the confines of a single program, 
to look both at feeds from video cameras and data collected by license 
plate readers. As a result, if a police officer noticed suspicious activity 
while monitoring a surveillance camera feed, he or she could easily 
check plate-reader data to see who had driven through the area recently. 
This is more efficient than the status quo, in which camera footage is 
viewed and stored in one program and plate-reader data is viewed and 
stored in a separate program. Second, integrating data into one center, 
with a common format, makes it easier to share that data with others in 
the region and beyond who might have need for it, and perhaps 
reciprocally to obtain surveillance data from others.108 
                                                     
104. Id. at 2. 
105. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
106. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
107. Id. 
108. How one feels about data integration probably depends on how one feels about surveillance 
in general. If one is of the view that the government is engaged in too much surveillance, then the 
barrier to surveillance posed by having to separately access, for example, surveillance camera feeds 
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In July 2010, city staff came before the council’s public safety 
committee to request authorization to accept $2.9 million in federal 
funds.109 No city council member asked a question, and no members of 
the public sought to comment. The committee unanimously granted the 
staff’s request.110 The entire process took less than two minutes. The 
request then went to the full city council, where it was one of sixty-five 
items on the consent calendar, a special list of non-controversial items 
that could be approved as a group through one vote rather than discussed 
and voted on individually. Neither members of the council nor the public 
commented on the issue.111 The press also took no notice of this 
development. 
The city and port worked on constructing the DAC for about three 
years. City staff integrated port and city surveillance cameras, the port’s 
intrusion detection system, the city’s gunshot detection technology, and 
mapping software112 into the DAC.113 In 2013, the project returned to the 
city council’s docket because city staff needed council authorization to 
accept a second round of federal funds.114 This time, city staff sought to 
accept up to two million dollars in additional port security grant funds to 
build out the DAC’s capacity, primarily by incorporating additional data 
sources.115 In its report to the council, the DAC team listed “City School 
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System” and California Department 
of Transportation cameras as data sources to add, as well as unspecified 
“[s]urveillance enhancements for City of Oakland historically high crime 
                                                     
and license plate reader records can be viewed positively. An officer would need to be highly 
motivated to go through the effort of gathering data across systems. If, on the other hand, one does 
not object to data collection, then the idea of making the data more easily accessible, and easier to 
analyze and share, can be considered a net benefit. 
109. Special Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 00:29 (July 13, 2010), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=706 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) 
(statement of Renee Domingo, City of Oakland Director of Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security). 
110. Id. at 3:00.  
111. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency/City Council, CITY OF 
OAKLAND, CAL., at 01:23 (July 20, 2010), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_ 
id=2&clip_id=712 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).  
112. As the name suggests, this is software that provides a detailed map of the city.  
113. CITY & PORT OF OAKLAND, JOINT DOMAIN AWARENESS CENTER, PHASE 2 CONTRACT 
AWARD RECOMMENDATION AND STAFF REPORT, at slide 7 (Jan. 28, 2014), 
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=2867275&GUID=02B29757-4333-419B-9403-
ED47610DEF90 [https://perma.cc/ZH8L-KQDP]. 
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areas.”116 City staff also floated the possibility of integrating private 
surveillance cameras into the DAC. 
The matter of whether to accept the second round of federal funding 
was first referred to the council’s public safety committee. Council 
member Dan Kalb asked about the DAC’s integration of video cameras, 
and where those cameras would be located: “First of all, this is all on 
port property, including airport, all the port property, right? It’s not the 
rest of the city.”117 Renee Domingo, the city’s emergency manager, 
responded, “It will also integrate any existing cameras the city has.”118 
Kalb followed up, “But on or adjacent to port property, not, like, four 
miles away from the port or anything, it’s all that general area, is that 
right?” Domingo did not provide a direct answer to this question.119 
Kalb moved onto other topics, but then circled back to ask, “I assume 
none of these cameras go into people’s living rooms or anything like 
that?”120 Domingo replied that they did not.121 The public safety 
committee then unanimously approved accepting the funding, resulting 
in the matter advancing to the full city council.122 
The exchange between Kalb and Domingo did not go unnoticed by 
members of the public. When the full city council met the following 
week, and the question of accepting a second infusion of federal money 
came up on the consent calendar, the sailing was not so smooth.123 
About a dozen individuals spoke against the DAC during the public 
comment period and none spoke in support. Many speakers were 
concerned about the paucity of available information on what would be 
done with data gathered in the DAC. The following is a representative 
comment: 
                                                     
116. Agenda Report Memorandum from Teresa Delach Reed, Fire Chief, City of Oakland, to 
Deanna J. Santana, City Adm’r, City of Oakland 5 (June 23, 2013), https://oakland. 
legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=2554079&GUID=BFC8C979-8FA8-4B7E-B8ED-6C0F54A 
60FFC [http://perma.cc/K9F3-JKKE]. 
117. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 00:27 (July 9, 2013), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1315 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2016).  
118. Id. at 00:28. 
119. Id.  
120. Id. at 00:30. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 00:31. 
123. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, CITY 
OF OAKLAND, CAL., (July 16, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=A&ID=254282& 
GUID=902659F8-00DA-45CB-8368-C86C2D45CCFA [https://perma.cc/PY4J-EU4X]. 
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We don’t know how long this data is going to be collected, we 
don’t know what other agencies it’s going to be shared with, we 
don’t know, you know, they were talking about having access to 
it on mobile devices by OPD. Any officer? Only a limited 
number of people? There are so many unanswered questions that 
you really should put a stop to this until you have some actual 
oversight.124 
Members of the council took these concerns to heart and decided to 
postpone action on the item until its next meeting.125 By the time the 
issue again arose two weeks later, the DAC had become the object of 
significant national press attention. At the local level, it was sufficiently 
controversial to prompt fifty members of the public to show up to 
express their views.126 
It is difficult to say with certainty why the DAC, which provoked no 
objection in 2010, proved so controversial in 2013. However, by 2013, 
the national political climate had grown considerably more hostile 
toward government surveillance. Just weeks before the DAC came 
before the council, the media began reporting a series of stories about 
the unprecedented scale and scope of the National Security Agency’s 
surveillance programs.127 Reporters based these stories on documents 
exfiltrated by government contractor Edward Snowden, whose dramatic 
escape to Hong Kong and subsequent flight to Moscow further fueled a 
media firestorm.128 For the first time since 9/11, members of the public 
appeared increasingly skeptical of the federal government’s surveillance 
initiatives. The DAC, although wholly unrelated to any of the programs 
                                                     
124. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency & City Council, CITY OF 
OAKLAND, CAL., at 02:52 (July 16, 2013), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=1320 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of David Colburn). 
125. Id. at 03:34. 
126. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., SPECIAL CONCURRENT MEETING OF THE OAKLAND 
REDEVELOPMENT SUCCESSOR AGENCY / CITY COUNCIL / GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT 
DISTRICT BOARD, at 35 (July 30, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID= 
258725&GUID=E6ABC786-3DB3-4F03-83C8-1DED575F4AC6 [http://perma.cc/M945-9NCH].  
127. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From 
Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/32BA-YBL3]; Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting 
Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order 
[https://perma.cc/JM86-PLFT].  
128. Tania Branigan & Miriam Elder, Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong for Moscow, 
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-
leaves-hong-kong-moscow [http://perma.cc/QTD7-N3HY]. 
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disclosed by Snowden, nonetheless may have been caught in the 
crosshairs. 
In response to increasing public concern, the city council imposed 
substantial privacy safeguards on the DAC. It limited the data that could 
be incorporated into the DAC to city- and port-owned sources,129 and it 
required city staff to develop a privacy and data retention policy for the 
DAC.130 Members of the public were largely unappeased because they 
wanted the entire enterprise shut down. However, the council approved 
the DAC, probably reflecting the sentiment expressed by council 
member (now Mayor) Libby Schaaf: 
We have tried our best to find the sweet spot. We are going to 
take advantage of the tools that we have at hand to make our city 
safe . . . and at the same time try and address the really 
legitimate and important concerns that have been raised . . . but 
if we do not approve this money tonight, we jeopardize losing 
valuable resources that will make the City of Oakland safer.131 
Unfortunately for proponents of the DAC, two key missteps by city 
staff provided ammunition for those who felt that Oakland city officials 
were either not competent or not trustworthy, and in either case should 
not be afforded the increased power for surveillance the DAC would 
bring. 
First, an investigation by the non-profit Oakland Privacy Working 
Group132 demonstrated that the contractor building the DAC had been 
hired in violation of a city prohibition on doing business with entities 
involved in nuclear weapons work.133 This revelation forced city staff to 
return to the city council on multiple occasions to secure approval of a 
new contractor,134 with each appearance giving opponents an 
opportunity to ramp up their objections.135 
                                                     
129. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., supra note 126, at 34–35. 
130. Id. 
131. Special Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency / City Council 
/ Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 06:54 (July 30, 2013), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1330 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2016). 
132. Matthew Artz, Nuclear Law Again Threatens Oakland Surveillance Hub, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.contracostatimes.com/news/ci_25019462/nuclear-law-again-
threatens-oakland-surveillance-hub [http://perma.cc/UQM6-XHWF]. 
133. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 03:28 (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1391 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2016). 
134. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., Meeting Minutes: Public Safety Committee, at 5 (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=268611&GUID=D7918CB2-FFAE-4FC0-
AC70-1E34F0EA11D2 [https://perma.cc/E4MQ-2E4S]; CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., Meeting 
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By early 2014, the volume of opposition was sufficient to prompt the 
city staff to request policy guidance from the council on whether the 
project should continue at all and, if so, in what form. At this point the 
DAC included 137 port security cameras, the port’s physical intrusion 
detection system, the city’s gunshot detection technology,136 the 
mapping program, and forty city traffic cameras.137 A January hearing 
revealed the city staff’s second major error: failure, despite the passage 
of eight months, to draft the privacy and data retention policy for the 
DAC that the city council had specifically directed them to draft. While 
staff then hurriedly put together what they called a draft privacy 
framework, city council members were harshly critical. They said that it 
should have come out months earlier, and one member characterized it 
“not as a draft of a set of policies” but “more like a draft of a draft of a 
draft.”138 
Things came to a head at a council meeting in March 2014, by which 
time the DAC had generated a truly remarkable amount of opposition. 
One hundred forty-nine members of the public submitted requests to 
speak at the meeting, and the comments they made were 
overwhelmingly negative. They came from a broad cross-section of the 
community. Dan Siegel, a prominent Oakland attorney and activist, 
specifically invoked the past use of COINTELPRO to attack the 
Panthers as a reason to oppose the DAC, as did some other older 
                                                     
Minutes: Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, at 
30 (Nov. 19, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=274014&GUID= 
40979A84-886E-4AE6-A254-6BE7A4E0197D [https://perma.cc/VU9P-SVXK] [hereinafter Nov. 
19 2013 Meeting Minutes].  
135. For example, at a November 19, 2013 full-council meeting at which the DAC team returned 
to obtain authorization to select a new contractor, sixty-one speakers showed up to provide 
comment on the DAC, and nearly all of them expressed negative views. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., 
Nov. 19 2013 Meeting Minutes, supra note 134. The council did, however, authorize the DAC team 
to seek out a new vendor, with the proviso that the council would need to authorize going forward 
with that vendor. Id. 
136. Gunshot detection technology is a network of microphones that is designed to detect 
gunshots and automatically report them to the police. Will Kane, Oakland Cops Aim to Scrap 
Gunfire-Detecting ShotSpotter, S.F. GATE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/ 
Oakland-cops-aim-to-scrap-gunfire-detecting-5316060.php [https://perma.cc/N9E4-QJSC]. 
137. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 1:56 (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1437 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2016). The figure forty is striking because the previous summer Domingo had told the council that 
the city had only four to five such cameras. It is unclear whether one of the figures was incorrect, or 
whether the city installed a substantial number of additional traffic cameras at the same time that 
members of the public were increasingly pushing back against the DAC. 
138. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency/City Council, CITY OF 
OAKLAND, CAL., at 4:53 (February 18, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=1449 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
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Oakland residents.139 Individuals who had recently participated in the 
Occupy Oakland demonstrations complained that the police 
department’s conduct toward demonstrators showed they were 
untrustworthy.140 Most strikingly, perhaps one-third of the public 
speakers expressly identified themselves as Muslim and grounded their 
opposition to the DAC in more general concerns about the surveillance 
of Muslims after 9/11.141 
In the end, a closely divided council voted to restrict the DAC to 
monitoring only the port and to remove the forty city traffic cameras 
from the DAC along with the portions of its gunshot detection system 
not proximate to the port.142 Further, the council forbade DAC personnel 
from sharing data with any local, state, or federal entity without a 
memorandum of understanding expressly authorized by the council, and 
it prohibited the addition of new “systems or capabilities” without 
council approval.143 It also reiterated the requirement that the council 
sign off on a privacy and data retention policy prior to activation of the 
DAC and convened a citizen task force to develop this policy.144 The 
DAC henceforth would be structured to focus on the immediate port 
area, with a close supervisory structure to ensure that the council would 
have to affirmatively approve any expansion of the DAC. 
City staff worked to assemble a group of individuals to serve on the 
privacy policy task force, including those with expertise in technology 
and civil liberties, those from a broad range of Oakland neighborhoods, 
and representatives of the business community.145 The resulting 
committee met dozens of times with city staff in meetings open to the 
public.146 It first gathered information about the DAC from city staff and 
                                                     
139. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, CITY 
OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 3:41 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=1462 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Concurrent Meeting] 
140. Id. at 4:02 (public comment of unnamed, self-identified protest participant). 
141. Id. (comments beginning at about 5:02). 
142. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, 
supra note 139 (meeting minutes at 17). 
143. Id. at 17–18. 
144. Id. at 18. 
145. Agenda Report Memorandum from Joe DeVries, Assistant to the City Adm’r, City of 
Oakland, to John A. Flores, Interim City Adm’r, City of Oakland 4 (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3479358&GUID=6DD7CFF6-804F-48C6-
AFDC-6DE72F3E1C3E [perma.cc/TJ8H-AW2Z]. 
146. See id. (the committee “met 18 times over six months” through January 2015); Agenda 
Report Memorandum from Joe DeVries, Assistant to the City Adm’r, City of Oakland, to John A. 
Flores, Interim City Administrator, City of Oakland 2 (Apr. 30, 2015), 
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formulated core principles to guide its work going forward. It then used 
these core principles to develop a draft privacy policy for the DAC.147 
The policy dealt with the key questions of data usage, storage, and 
dissemination.148 The policy did so by limiting the DAC’s uses to a 
specifically enumerated list (e.g., active shooter, bomb threat, 
earthquake); by forbidding the DAC to store data unless relevant to one 
of the enumerated uses; and by prohibiting data sharing except pursuant 
to court order or a written memorandum of understanding or contract 
approved by the city council.149 
This process resulted in the creation of a policy that both city staff 
and the community members could support and that ultimately passed 
the city council unanimously.150 Although it is difficult to generalize 
about what the public thought, segments of the public that had been 
critical of the DAC expressed satisfaction with this outcome.151 
The process was so successful that city staff supported the 
committee’s suggestion that a permanent standing privacy advisory 
commission be formed to examine privacy in the city as a whole and to 
develop a citywide surveillance equipment ordinance.152 As the city staff 
member charged with meeting with the committee put it to the city 
council: 
This has been a new field for us as far as staff is concerned, 
partnering with the community, partnering with privacy 
advocates, bringing our first responders and law enforcement to 
the table. It’s been a rich dialog and I think it will continue to be 
a rich dialog as more technologies are introduced to the 
marketplace, and having an ordinance that guides and creates a 
                                                     
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3728533&GUID=F9217BE0-83E6-479F-B072-
A370FCFCB846 [http://perma.cc/YXM8-2DWJ] (noting a series of additional meetings in 2015). 
147. DAC Draft Privacy Policy Public Comments, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/CityAdministration/OAK051790 [http://perma.cc/ 
MTA8-GEWC] (describing the committee’s formation and its development of the privacy policy).  
148. See OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 85,638 (June 2, 2015). The council had dealt with the 
threshold issue of what data was to be collected by passing legislation specifying what sources 
could be fed into the DAC. See OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 84,869 (Mar. 4, 2014). 
149. OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 85,638 (June 2, 2015). 
150. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency and the City Council, 
CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 8:59:00 (June 2, 2015), http://oakland.granicus.com/ 
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1785 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
151. Id. at 9:04:00 (public comment period). 
152. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 1:01:45 (May 26, 2015), 
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1781 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2016). 
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public process to avoid surprises in the future is good 
government.153 
The city council voted in favor of creating a permanent standing 
privacy advisory commission as well.154 
3. Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making in Oakland 
While the local police department in Seattle caused the backlash 
against its surveillance initiatives by proceeding secretly, in Oakland it 
was the elected representatives who misjudged the eventual public 
reaction by not understanding the implications of a new technology. The 
Oakland case study therefore highlights potential shortcomings of 
relying on local elected representatives to set surveillance policy. 
Council members have many matters to attend to that place severe 
constraints on their ability to devote time to, and develop expertise 
about, surveillance policy. Had the council members understood the 
technology, they might have avoided the protracted and strident 
controversy that unfolded. 
As in Seattle, the federal government set the stage for these mistakes 
by allocating money for the DAC without requiring that anyone develop 
a policy for its use. This left both elected representatives and city staff 
scrambling to fill the void once the public and city council members 
grasped the DAC’s capabilities. 
In Seattle, the debate largely ignored the fact that the technologies 
were being promulgated in the name of national security. In Oakland, 
the fact that the DAC also served a federal national security purpose was 
an additional strike against it. Oakland’s distrust of its police department 
may have been enough on its own to kill the DAC, but the Muslim 
community’s feeling of being unfairly scrutinized by the federal 
government after 9/11155 and the skepticism generated by Edward 
Snowden’s disclosures poisoned the atmosphere still further.156 
Oakland offers another path forward. The most innovative and 
successful piece of the Oakland story is the city council’s creation of a 
                                                     
153. Id. at 1:04:00.  
154. OAKLAND, CAL., ORDINANCE 13,349 (Jan. 19, 2016), https://oakland.legistar.com/ 
View.ashx?M=F&ID=4220932&GUID=AA93003C-FE0C-45DB-9F0A-AD0C377D5B5A 
[https://perma.cc/4TTH-Q3YD].  
155. See Concurrent Meeting, supra note 139, at 5:02.  
156. Brian Hofer, How the Fight to Stop Oakland’s Domain Awareness Center Laid the 
Groundwork for the Oakland Privacy Commission, ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA (Sept. 21, 
2016), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/how-fight-stop-oaklands-domain-awareness-center-laid-
groundwork-oakland-privacy-commission [https://perma.cc/NHC6-PNCA].  
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citizen task force to draft a privacy policy for the DAC.157 But as 
successful as the citizen privacy committee was in Oakland, it is unlikely 
to be replicable in very many places. The success of such a committee 
depends on a continued high level of interest and day-to-day 
involvement by members of the public. Oakland’s strong tradition of 
activism (and cadre of dedicated activists willing to spend their evenings 
and weekends in city meeting rooms) and high level of concern about 
police abuses of power were key ingredients. Not many municipalities 
share these features.158 
At the same time, the Oakland experience provides reason to be 
skeptical that Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinances will result 
in meaningful oversight or achieve significant public buy-in. From the 
start, Oakland city staff did voluntarily much of what Seattle now 
mandates. They informed the city council prior to seeking federal 
funding159 and, after they won the grant, presented information about the 
DAC to the city council in an open hearing.160 These steps were not 
enough to provoke meaningful engagement by the council or to win the 
DAC much-needed political legitimacy.161 
Whatever the differences between Oakland’s and Seattle’s 
surveillance controversies, both shared the bedrock feature that a city 
council was the ultimate policy-making body. This was not the case in 
the next case study, where a regional law enforcement authority received 
federal funds for a surveillance initiative, raising a host of additional 
transparency and accountability concerns. 
C.  San Diego Acquires Facial Recognition Technology 
Beginning in 2007, a regional law enforcement authority in the San 
Diego area began using federal money to develop and deploy facial 
recognition technology. This technology allowed officers to determine 
whether individuals they encountered had arrest records simply by 
snapping photos of them. The public did not learn of the technology 
until 2013, by which time it was well established and widely viewed as a 
success. Publicity about the technology in 2013 prompted the regional 
                                                     
157. See Concurrent Meeting, supra note 139. 
158. See Jonathan Mahler, Oakland, the Last Refuge of Radical America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/magazine/oakland-occupy-movement.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3N4T-B5UT]. 
159. See supra note 103. 
160. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
161. Id. 
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authority to adopt a fairly sound set of rules regulating the use of the 
technology to protect individual privacy. 
1. History of the San Diego Association of Government’s Automated 
Regional Justice Information System 
In contrast to Oakland and Seattle, the trajectory of San Diego’s 
surveillance initiative was divorced from broader questions of 
community-police relations. Instead, it was the product of the specific 
institution that fostered its development: the Automated Regional Justice 
Information System (ARJIS), a law enforcement authority embedded 
within a regional planning entity, the San Diego Association of 
Governments (SANDAG). 
SANDAG coordinates the activities of nineteen local governments in 
the greater San Diego area.162 Its primary focus is on regional planning 
issues such as transportation and housing, not law enforcement. Its 
visibility is low. Media and advocacy groups do not monitor its activities 
regularly, and few members of the public have heard of it. While 
SANDAG proceedings are open and offer opportunities for public 
comment, virtually no members of the public attend.163 
ARJIS is a sub-entity of SANDAG.164 Its mandate is “to share 
information among justice agencies throughout San Diego and Imperial 
Counties.”165 ARJIS has eighty-two member agencies, including local, 
state, and federal law enforcement organizations with operations in the 
                                                     
162. About SANDAG, SANDAG, http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=about.home 
[https://perma.cc/4TKN-XE4Y]. 
163. SANDAG, An Assessment of its Role in the San Diego Region, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/sandag/sandag_033006.htm#governance [https://perma.cc 
/5ALH-DJ8N] (“Few interest group representatives—and even fewer ordinary residents—attend 
SANDAG board meetings. Public comment is limited.”). SANDAG’s governance structure may be 
part of the reason why. Members of the public do not elect anyone to SANDAG. See id. Instead, 
SANDAG is controlled by a board of directors consisting of people elected to positions in one of 
SANDAG’s member governments, who are then appointed to the SANDAG board as an additional 
duty. Id. For example, the board’s chair is Ron Roberts, a member of the San Diego Board of 
Supervisors. About SANDAG: Board of Directors, SANDAG, http://www.sandag.org/index.asp? 
fuseaction=about.board [https://perma.cc/WVQ4-XHVT].  
164. ARJIS Governance, AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., http://www.arjis.org/ 
SitePages/Policies.aspx [https://perma.cc/69ZV-TX8U]. 
165. See What Is ARJIS?, AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., http://www.arjis.org/ 
SitePages/WhatIsARJIS.aspx [https://perma.cc/TQJ3-582L]; AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. 
SYS., ARJIS TACIDS: TACTICAL FACIAL RECOGNITION IN THE FIELD, 1–3 (2013), 
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LEIM/2013Presentations/2013%20LEIM%20Conference%2
0Workshop%20-%20Technical%20Track%20-%20TACIDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTK4-V658] 
[hereinafter ARJIS TACIDS]. 
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area.166 Many of these agencies contribute both money and the data they 
gather to ARJIS, which provides tools to allow law enforcement officers 
“to efficiently query various regional, state, and federal data sets for 
subject information and case leads.”167 In addition to facial recognition 
technology, ARJIS has created other tools, including a searchable 
repository of license plate reader data168 and access to documentation 
regarding millions of police-citizen interactions, from traffic citations to 
arrest reports.169 
Because ARJIS is a single-mission agency focused on information 
sharing, its structure is designed to facilitate that mission.170 It has a 
formal technical working group, which evaluates new technologies prior 
to adoption.171 ARJIS staffs this working group with a mix of end users 
(e.g., investigators, patrol officers) and managers to ensure the 
technologies are useful to everyone.172 It also has a business working 
group that addresses legal, ethical, and regulatory issues.173 Both groups 
must vet any significant change to an ARJIS system.174 
ARJIS may sound unusual, but it is not an anomaly. It is one of many 
regional law enforcement agencies around the country. Researchers have 
identified over 250 public safety networks that develop inter-agency 
collaborations among public safety organizations at the local, state, and 
national levels and suggest that formation of these organizations has 
“gained additional impetus in the post 9/11 environment.”175 
                                                     
166. See ARJIS TACIDS, supra note 165, at 1–3. 
167. See BOARD OF DIRECTORS AGENDA, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3849_17876.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA2E-
7KCK] [hereinafter SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014] (agenda item no. 14-07-2A, “Public 
Safety Program Overview” and Attachment 1). 
168. The repository is a searchable database of the times and locations where license plates were 
seen. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO 
RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-
alprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J27-4N3F].  
169. ARJIS TACIDS, supra note 165, at 3. 
170. See Michael J. Tyworth, Reflections of Identity: How Information Systems Mirror the 
Organization as a Social Actor 128–29 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania 
State University) (on file with author).  
171. Id. at 94–95. 
172. Id. at 130–32. 
173. Id. at 95. 
174. Id. at 135. 
175. Christine B. Williams, et. al, The Formation of Inter-Organizational Information Sharing 
Networks in Public Safety: Cartographic Insights on Rational Choice and Institutional 
Explanations, 14 INFO. POLITY 13, 15 (2009). In addition to ARJIS, other examples of such entities 
operating at the regional level include the San Francisco area’s Bay Area Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI), a regional authority with voting representation from the three major cities and 
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The history of ARJIS helps explain why it is an especially obscure 
component of SANDAG. While ARJIS is now part of SANDAG, that 
was not always the case. Established as a regional organization in 1980, 
ARJIS was a coalition of law enforcement agencies with a board of 
directors staffed with a member of each agency.176 In 2004, ARJIS was 
consolidated into SANDAG to achieve greater administrative 
efficiency.177 The ARJIS board was reconstituted as SANDAG’s 
Advisory Committee (generally referred to as the “Public Safety 
Committee”), and its membership expanded to include some elected 
representatives.178 However, it was still an outlier among SANDAG’s 
committees, where usually only elected representatives are permitted to 
vote. At the time of the events described below, the Public Safety 
Committee’s voting membership consisted of six elected representatives 
and nine law enforcement representatives.179 
Even this makes elected representatives look more involved than they 
really were. According to an internal SANDAG audit, the Public Safety 
Committee’s “primary function is to serve in an advisory capacity.”180 
The real power rested with the Public Safety Committee’s 
subcommittee, the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s Management Committee.181 Every 
member of the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s Management Committee, except the 
San Diego district attorney, was a law enforcement officer of some 
type.182 
                                                     
some of the counties surrounding San Francisco Bay that allocates federal UASI funds to area 
governments. See About the Bay Area UASI, BAY AREA URBAN AREAS SEC. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.bayareauasi.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/6FBY-Q79Y]; Programs, BAY AREA 
URBAN AREAS SEC. INITIATIVE, http://bayareauasi.org/programs [https://perma.cc/D5E9-GRTC]. 
The DHS requires that cities and counties take a regional approach to implementation of the UASI 
program, which has led to the formation of various regional law enforcement authorities that exist 
for the purpose of expending federal UASI funds. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement for 
Participating Orlando Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Agencies (July 29, 2010), 
http://www.edocs.ci.orlando.fl.us/asv/paperlessagenda.nsf/60f252ae0a55937d852573f50052d808/3
e913aa55b621811852577a600515ebb/$FILE/UASI_FY_2009_MOA_OCSO0001.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RJS4-EUWE]. Another is the Capital Wireless Information Net (CapWIN), a cross-
jurisdictional organization of public safety entities in the greater Washington, D.C., area. See About 
CapWIN, UNIV. OF MD. A. JAMES CLARK SCH. OF ENG’G, http://www.capwin.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/UH3P-B9FN]. 
176. Tyworth, supra note 167, at 90–92. 
177. Id. at 92–93. 
178. Id. at 93. 
179. SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014, supra note 167. 
180. Tyworth, supra note 167, 93–94. 
181. See id. at 94. 
182. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, CHIEFS’/SHERIFF’S MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
AGENDA 7 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_4124_18902.pdf 
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2.   The Controversy Over San Diego’s Facial Recognition 
Technology 
In 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Center for 
Investigative Reporting (CIR) jointly revealed that ARJIS had deployed 
facial recognition technology.183 The technology allows officers on 
patrol to use a tablet to snap a photo of a person they encounter.184 It 
then compares the photo to a database of photos of individuals who have 
been booked in the San Diego area.185 Within ten to fifteen seconds,186 
the system displays a photo lineup of up to ten possible matches in 
ranking order of confidence.187 If the officer confirms there is a match, 
the system automatically queries a variety of additional databases (e.g., a 
database of county warrants, DMV data) and returns information 
regarding the person’s identity and criminal history.188 EFF and CIR 
reported that twenty-five law enforcement agencies operating in the San 
Diego area, including local police departments and federal law 
enforcement agencies, were using the system.189 
The widespread availability of facial recognition technology could 
transform the ordinary, daily experience of being in public. In the hands 
of private citizens, individuals would be able to identify and pull up 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/A2XG-928A] (attendance sheet for March 4, 2015 meeting listing committee 
members and voting statuses).  
183. See Jennifer Lynch & Dave Maass, San Diego Gets in Your Face with New Mobile 
Identification System, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/san-diego-gets-your-face-new-mobile-identification-system 
[https://perma.cc/R6FF-DB8B]; Ali Winston, Facial Recognition, Once a Battlefield Tool, Lands in 
San Diego County, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Nov. 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/ 
reports/facial-recognition-once-battlefield-tool-lands-san-diego-county-5502 [https://perma.cc/ 
JLW9-CLZ2]. 
184. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183. 
185. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183. 
186. See AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL 
RECOGNITION 3 (2015), http://www.arjis.org/RegionalPolicies/ARJIS%20Facial%20Recognition 
%20AUP%20-%20Approved%20-%20Rev150213.pdf [https://perma.cc/B86U-WN7X] [hereinafter 
ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION]. 
187. Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=PSC011813 (audio at 0:43:15) 
(agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the Field”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statements of 
ARJIS Program Manager Lloyd Muenzer and San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Deputy 
Darrin Peralta). 
188. AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., TACIDS: TACTICAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 
USING FACIAL RECOGNITION 4 (2013) [hereinafter TACIDS], https://www.eff.org/document/11-
tacids-final-report-final [https://perma.cc/JGW3-QV27] (final report submitted to U.S. Department 
of Justice). 
189. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183. 
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public information about strangers in their vicinity, and brick and mortar 
stores would be capable of identifying customers as soon as they crossed 
the threshold. The impact on law enforcement agents is also potentially 
significant; agents would be able to identify those they encountered and 
would be able to pull up their criminal histories, warrant information and 
threat assessment scores.190 
When ARJIS first deployed facial recognition technology, the use of 
this technology was constrained by the way the system was designed 
rather than through a written use policy. The system only compares the 
images officers take to booking photos, and, if there is a match, officers 
have the option to display the subject’s criminal history and any 
outstanding arrest warrants.191 The guideline appears to have been that 
officers could deploy the technology on anyone they stopped as well as 
anyone who consented.192 
ARJIS’s development of facial recognition stretches back to at least 
2007. In that year, the DOJ awarded ARJIS a $418,000 grant through a 
program to promote “information-led policing research, technology 
                                                     
190. For example, police in Fresno rely on a program to assign individuals they encounter threat 
assessment scores based on reviews of data on these individuals from “arrest reports, property 
records, commercial databases, deep Web searches and . . . social-media postings.” Justin Jouvenal, 




191. ARJIS could have built a more sweeping tool, for example by comparing photos officers 
take to those contained in the California Department of Motor Vehicles photo database, which 
would have allowed police officers to identify a broader range of people. The fact that ARJIS did 
not do that is an example of how a tool can be designed to protect privacy. For an exploration of 
privacy by design, see ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, 
https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET5F-
R25A]; Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1436–38 (2000) (“[L]aw can and should establish a new set of institutional 
parameters that supply incentives for the design of privacy-enhancing technologies to flourish.)”; Ira 
S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1413 (2011) (“This 
Article seeks to clarify the meaning of privacy by design and to suggest how privacy officials might 
develop appropriate regulatory incentives that offset the certain economic costs and somewhat 
uncertain privacy benefits of this new approach.”). 
192. Compare Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, 
at 0:59:05 (Jan. 18, 2013), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=PSC011813 
(agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the Field”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (discussion of 
when use of facial recognition tool is permissible in 2013) with ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY 
FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 186, at 2 (2015 policy which more extensively limited the 
use of facial recognition technology). 
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development, testing and evaluation.”193 ARJIS dubbed its facial 
recognition program the Tactical Identification System, or TACIDS.194 
The project proved technically complex and its development stretched 
on for several years.195 In 2011, ARJIS appears to have deployed 
TACIDS for the first time.196 
Although it took ARJIS years to develop TACIDS, it used this time to 
conduct research with the goal of identifying an effective product.197 
ARJIS consulted with the FBI’s Biometric Center of Excellence and the 
California Department of Justice, as well as local user groups.198 It 
identified numerous vendors of facial recognition technology that 
catered to law enforcement customers and vetted them thoroughly 
through use of questionnaires, on-site visits, and product 
demonstrations.199 
While the technical complexities of TACIDS may have slowed its 
rollout, it quickly proved to be popular once it got into law enforcement 
agents’ hands. By 2013, when EFF and CIR alerted the public to the 
program, there were 178 tablets with facial recognition capability in use 
by officers, and other officers regularly emailed photos to those with 
tablets so the photos could be run through the system.200 ARJIS staff 
members started to think bigger and bolder. They began to contemplate 
applying the software to fixed cameras from court buildings and public 
                                                     
193. See NIJ Awards in FY 2007, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 2008), 
http://www.nij.gov/funding/awards/pages/2007.aspx [https://perma.cc/7UHK-WMWM] (grant no. 
2007-RG-CX-K001). 
194. See id.; Letter from Regina B. Schofield, Assistant Attorney Gen., Department of Justice, to 
Dr. Pamela Scanlon, Automated Regional Justice Information System 1 (Sept. 13, 2007), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/01_-_tacids_award_letter_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PVX-
DUSL] (confirming the award of the grant from the Department of Justice); AUTOMATED REG’L 
JUSTICE INFO. SYS., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE FY07 FINAL PROPOSAL: INFORMATION-LED POLICING: 
TACTICAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (TACIDS) 4 (2007), https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/02_-
_5214-mandatory_tacids_-_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFQ9-7SV8]. 
195. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, GMS PROGRESS REPORTS—COMPILATION (2012), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/12_-_tacids_report_summary_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN2G-
V5ZG] (semi-annual TACIDS status reports for National Institute of Justice from Oct. 1, 2007 
through June 30, 2012). 
196. TACIDS, supra note 188, at 29–33. 
197. Id. at 7–17. 
198. Id. at 7–9. 
199. Id. at 10–16. 
200. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183. ARJIS leveraged Samsung devices (250 tablets and 50 
smartphones) obtained for Terrorism Liaison Officers. See SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, PUBLIC 
SAFETY COMMITTEE AGENDA (Jan. 18, 2013), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3535 
_15446.pdf [https://perma.cc/94R2-TF5E] (discussing agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the 
Field”). 
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transportation facilities, presumably to screen for wanted persons.201 An 
ARJIS staffer stated that “the facial recognition software is not currently 
used as surveillance as yet, but is in future plans.”202 
EFF’s and CIR’s investigations caused SANDAG board members to 
become concerned about the ARJIS facial recognition program.203 At 
around the same time, SANDAG was sued over a different ARJIS 
surveillance program, the use of automatic license plate readers to 
capture and store the time and location of vehicles observed around the 
city.204 These developments sparked an awakening for SANDAG board 
members, who realized they did not understand what ARJIS did or how 
it was managed.205 Members reported being only dimly aware of the 
license plate and facial recognition programs, which they found alarming 
given that the entity they were charged with running had been sued over 
the former and was under public scrutiny because of the latter. Having 
been caught off guard, some SANDAG board members were concerned 
that decisions about SANDAG’s law enforcement activities that 
implicated public policy were not flowing upward to the board.206 
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom instituted a review of the Public 
Safety Committee and the programs it oversees for the SANDAG 
board.207 The review concluded that the Public Safety Committee was 
                                                     
201. See SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, supra note 200.  
202. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, CHIEFS’/SHERIFF’S MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AGENDA 6 
(Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3671_15747.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8WGQ-CBNA] (statement of ARJIS staff member Lloyd Muenzer).  
203. See Meetings Audio Archives, Board of Directors, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, at 0:08:38 
(July 11, 2014), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=BOD071114 (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2016) [hereinafter SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014] (statement of Lemon Grove 
Mayor Mary Sessom) (discussing agenda item no. 2, “Public Safety Program at SANDAG”). 
204. See Lee Ann O’Neal, SANDAG Knows Where You’ve Been, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 
17, 2013), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/jun/17/license-plate-reader-LPR-san-diego-
surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/CZ3W-KYU6]. The agency had amassed a database of some 32 
million plate hits, which were accessible to agents throughout the region. The lawsuit did not allege 
that the plate reader program was unlawful. Rather, a private citizen sued ARJIS under the public 
records act, demanding to see what records it was keeping on the movements of his vehicle. 
205. See SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203. 
206. According to SANDAG Board member Ron Roberts, a member of the San Diego County 
Board of Supervisors, “as a member here, it would have been impossible to know what was going 
on. [The Board] was buried in the budgets . . . it would have taken years of research to find exactly 
what was being done, what was money being spent on, to what extent were there policies that were 
guiding this.” SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203, at 1:23:37. 
207. See Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS , at 
1:06:17, 1:08:06 (June 20, 2014) http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc& 
mid=PSC062014 (agenda item no. 7, “Public Safety at SANDAG—Policy Review”) (containing 
statements of SANDAG Strategic Advisor Diane Eidam and Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom) 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
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out of step with SANDAG’s overall structure.208 Other SANDAG 
committees reserved their voting membership almost exclusively to 
elected representatives, but unelected officials, primarily from law 
enforcement, controlled nine of the Public Safety Committee’s fifteen 
positions.209 The committee was also unique in creating a standing 
subcommittee—the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s management committee—“that is 
accorded more responsibility and authority than the Policy Advisory 
Committee itself.”210 The report concluded that “current policy and 
practice do not provide a mechanism to ensure that the [Public Safety 
Committee] and [SANDAG] Board have the opportunity to weigh in on 
public policy issues related to ARJIS.”211 To rectify matters, the review 
recommended reallocating votes so that elected officials had a 6-5 
majority on the Public Safety Committee and also requiring that the 
SANDAG board approve all applications ARJIS wished to submit for 
federal grant funds.212 
The SANDAG board did approve the grant application 
recommendation.213 But it rejected a 6-5 vote split, and instead adopted a 
6-6 allocation of votes between elected representatives and law 
enforcement agents.214 Chula Vista Police Chief David Bejarano, 
speaking on behalf of the San Diego County Chiefs and Sheriffs 
Association, stated that preserving law enforcement agents’ control 
would enable them to “use our hundreds of years of experience . . . as 
subject matter experts . . . so we continue to have, again, the best 
operational practices, the best policy as we move forward in maximizing 
our technology.”215 In addition, law enforcement agents framed the issue 
as one of equality between themselves and elected representatives. As 
Bejarano put it, “We simply want an equal voice at the table.”216 This 
                                                     
208. See id. 
209. SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014, supra note 167 (Public Safety Program Review).  
210. Id. at 13. 
211. Id. at 14.  
212. Id.; SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203, at 1:21:44 (statement of 
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom). 
213. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS AGENDA (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3863_18225.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ7Z-LRK5] 
(agenda item no. 14-09-18, “Public Safety at SANDAG—Policy Review”) (recommending 
reducing the number of unelected members so that it was equal to the number of elected members). 
214. See id.  
215. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 200, at 1:02:13 (statement of David 
Bejarano). 
216. Meetings Audio Archives, Executive Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, at 0:40:52 
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=EC091214 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
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view—that there should be equal numbers of votes for elected and 
unelected representatives—prevailed, although there were some 
dissenters. SANDAG board member and Escondido Mayor Sam Abed’s 
comment was representative of the dissenters: “We are the elected 
officials. If we have to answer to our voters, then we have to be in 
charge of policy. We are not compromising with other elected officials. 
We are compromising with staff. This is a very fundamental institutional 
issue.”217 
Throughout the debate, no civil liberties groups or members of the 
public showed up to express their views. SANDAG officials seemed 
unaware that drawing on community expertise was even an option. 
When asked by one board member whether ARJIS had consulted with 
local civil liberties groups, Sessom stated: “This is a new, emerging 
field, and there’s not a lot of privacy experts here.”218 (In fact, San Diego 
has a robust local ACLU affiliate.)219 ARJIS staff said that instead of 
turning to civil liberties groups, they had relied on the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police and the DHS for guidance.220 
In the wake of public attention to facial recognition technology and 
board members’ concerns regarding oversight, ARJIS created, and the 
SANDAG board adopted, an acceptable-use policy for its facial 
recognition technology.221 The policy’s data handling provisions are 
reasonably protective of privacy, allowing for only data collection and 
retention necessary for the program to meet its specified purposes. The 
policy states that facial recognition should be used “for official law 
enforcement purposes only,” and that “releasing data . . . for non-law 
enforcement purposes is prohibited.”222 It further specifies that the 
technology should only be used under two circumstances. First, it can be 
used to assist in the identification of individuals who have been detained 
based on reasonable suspicion and who do not have identification or 
                                                     
217. Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS , at 
0:49:33, 1:08:06 (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings 
.sc&mid=BOD092614 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
218. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 201, at 1:14:15 (statement of 
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom). 
219. Cf. Board and Staff Information, ACLU SAN DIEGO, https://www.aclusandiego.org/about-
us/board-and-staff-information/ [https://perma.cc/M8HV-ZZE9] (illustrating staff size).  
220. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 201, at 1:14:46 (statement of Pam 
Scanlon). 
221. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES 2 (Feb. 13, 
2015), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_4066_19049.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDQ7-
FPYB]. 
222. See ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 186, at 3. 
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who appear to be using false identification.223 Second, it can be used to 
identify individuals who are unable to identify themselves, such as 
deceased or incapacitated individuals.224 The only data collected are the 
photos officers take, and those are deleted within twenty-four hours.225 
The policy is silent on the issue of sharing but, given the aggressive data 
deletion schedule, sharing with other agencies would be out of step with 
the general tenor of the policy. 
In the meantime, the TACIDS user base continues to grow. By 
February 2015, there were approximately 800 registered TACIDS users 
representing twenty-eight law enforcement agencies. 
3. Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making by the San Diego 
Association of Governments 
In this case study, ARJIS’s status as a regional law enforcement 
authority was a major reason why San Diego rolled out facial 
recognition technology in a non-transparent fashion. The public is 
largely ignorant of SANDAG’s existence. The normal, everyday 
trappings of legislative oversight are absent: SANDAG board members 
hold their meetings in front of empty public galleries, without much 
press attention. 
Federal funding made it unclear whose job it is to set a use policy for 
facial recognition technology. Options include the federal government 
(because it paid for the technology), SANDAG (because it received the 
funding and developed and promulgated the technology), and end user 
law enforcement agencies (because they deploy the technology in the 
field). In contrast to Seattle and Oakland, the federal government funded 
TACIDs through a program specifically designed for law enforcement, 
not national security purposes. This meant the goals of federal funders 
and the local grantee were aligned. The grant was designed to promote 
information-led policing, and that is exactly what ARJIS wanted to do. 
This case study provides little in the way of lessons for increasing 
transparency and democratic accountability for surveillance policy 
making. Although SANDAG did take steps to increase its oversight of 
ARJIS, its governance limitations are fundamental and due to the 
structure of the organization. 
                                                     
223. Id. at 2. 
224. Id. at 3. 
225. Id. at 5. 
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D. Lessons from Case Studies 
Collectively, the case studies contain lessons about the structural and 
institutional factors that lead to surveillance policy making by 
procurement. They also demonstrate the confusion federal spending 
programs can generate about who is responsible for policy decisions and 
some of the spillover effects the federal government’s national security 
programs can have on more routine forms of policing. Finally, they point 
toward some ways to bring a greater measure of transparency and 
accountability to local surveillance policy making. 
The three case studies reveal strikingly different ways that law 
enforcement agencies set surveillance policy without the meaningful 
involvement of elected representatives or members of the public. In 
Seattle, the police department was chronically unable or unwilling to 
bring city council members into the loop regarding its surveillance 
initiatives.226 In Oakland, city staff diligently kept the city council 
apprised of its plans, but it took a few years for council members and 
members of the public to grasp what they were being told.227 In San 
Diego, SANDAG’s organizational structure left ARJIS largely 
unsupervised, an issue compounded by SANDAG also being 
comparatively remote from residents of the geographic area it serves.228 
In all three cases, the federal government provided funding for 
surveillance technology acquisition but did not require that any 
guidelines be developed for protecting civil rights and liberties or that 
there be meaningful involvement by members of the public or elected 
representatives. This left elected representatives scrambling to impose 
such guidelines retroactively after programs became controversial. 
Further, the case studies highlight the interplay between federal 
programs designed to enhance national security and more routine local 
law enforcement practices. In Seattle, the federal government’s national 
security objectives were irrelevant to the local debate, which turned on 
the impacts of surveillance technology on day-to-day policing.229 In 
Oakland, the federal government’s national security objectives were an 
additional strike against the surveillance center.230 By contrast, it is 
worth asking whether the alignment between DOJ’s goal of promoting 
                                                     
226. See supra section II.A.2. 
227. See supra section II.B.2. 
228. See supra section II.C.2. 
229. See supra section II.A.2. 
230. See supra section II.B.2. 
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information-led policing and ARJIS’s organizational mission contributed 
to the successful adoption of facial recognition technology.231 
The case studies also suggest ways in which local surveillance policy 
can be made more transparent and accountable, but none is likely to be a 
global fix. A Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinance will require 
law enforcement agencies to produce data management protocols and, as 
a result, think through key data management issues. Whether the process 
of obtaining council approval will be pro forma or will result in 
meaningful public engagement remains to be seen. The Oakland 
innovation of forming a privacy advisory committee is a viable solution 
for that community, but likely depends too heavily on the time and 
expertise of local residents to work in many other places. San Diego 
restored some measure of democratic control over ARJIS’s surveillance 
initiatives, but SANDAG is so divorced from the population it is 
designed to serve that it is hard to see this as a substantial improvement 
in accountability. 
III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE POLICY 
MAKING BY PROCUREMENT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
This Part explores the broader implications of the case studies. It first 
considers what factors are relevant to setting surveillance policy. 
Surveillance technology has the potential to enhance public safety but 
also poses risks to privacy and other civil liberties and rights.232 Because 
benefits and costs are empirically uncertain and setting surveillance 
policy requires trading off incommensurable values, there is no uniform 
answer to how much or what type of surveillance is appropriate.233 
However, there is widespread agreement that deployment of surveillance 
technology ought to be governed by a policy setting out how the 
technology will be used and that such policies should address the key 
issues of data collection, retention, use, and sharing.234 Thus, the fact 
that all three case studies resulted in the proliferation of surveillance 
technology ungoverned by such policies suggests a structural defect in 
how surveillance policy is set. 
This Part then considers the implications of the case studies for how 
we think about accountability when the federal government encourages 
local surveillance without requiring adoption of use policies. The 
                                                     
231. See supra section II.C.2. 
232. See infra section III.A. 
233. See infra section III.A. 
234. See infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court has privileged federal interventions in the form of 
conditional grants-in-aid over federal interventions that commandeer 
state and local officials precisely because of its view that spending 
programs do a better job of preserving clear lines of accountability.235 
But the case studies show that spending programs can generate 
considerable confusion over who is responsible for policy choices. This 
may be particularly true when the government creates policy voids by 
incompletely addressing a policy matter. 
Finally, this Part situates the case studies within the federal 
government’s broader efforts to work more closely with local law 
enforcement agencies to prevent, investigate, and respond to acts of 
terror.236 Particularly given the dual-purpose nature of much surveillance 
technology, these initiatives tend to bleed over into how local officers 
conduct routine policing.237 This suggests that any cost-benefit analysis 
of the federal government’s national security programs should consider 
not only their impact on national security but also on law enforcement, 
including transparency and accountability. 
A. Considerations for Selecting Surveillance Policy 
Optimizing surveillance policy requires assessing the capacity of 
technology to aid in the prevention and detection of criminal activity 
while identifying possible harms to privacy, free speech, and other civil 
rights and liberties. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to how a 
surveillance technology should be utilized, every surveillance scheme 
raises the same basic questions about what data should be collected, how 
long it should be stored, what uses should be made of it, and with whom 
it should be shared. Thus, while surveillance outcomes may be 
heterogeneous, the basic factors that every policy maker should consider 
are the same. 
Surveillance technology has many potential benefits for advancing 
public safety. For example, technologies facilitating data collection can 
gather information relevant to investigating crime, as in the case of 
wiretapping the telephone of someone suspected of illegal activity.238 
The value of the large-scale collection of data on individuals’ activities 
made possible by modern computer-driven technology is less clear. Law 
                                                     
235. See infra section III.B.  
236. See infra section III.C. 
237. See infra section III.C. 
238. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (concerning electronic 
surveillance of a telephone booth). 
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enforcement agencies assert that large-scale data collection can play a 
role in investigating criminal activity, including terrorism, or in 
apprehending the perpetrators of such activity. Even data gathered with 
no immediate suspect or crime in mind can be useful in some future 
investigation. For example, New Jersey’s attorney general claimed that 
“careful analysis of stored [automated license plate reader] data 
can . . . be used to detect suspicious activities that are consistent with the 
modus operandi of criminals.”239 In addition, deploying surveillance 
technology in a visible manner may deter crime.240 For example, a 
prominent study in San Francisco demonstrated that the deployment of 
surveillance cameras resulted in a substantial decline in property 
crimes.241 The impact was on larceny theft; the deployment of 
surveillance cameras had no impact on violent crimes.242 
Against these benefits of surveillance technology and large-scale data 
collection, it is necessary to consider their potential to cause harm. Neil 
Richards has argued that surveillance can “chill the exercise of . . . civil 
liberties,” particularly by threatening “intellectual privacy.”243 He also 
                                                     
239. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., DIRECTIVE NO. 2010-5, 2 (2010), 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W5EM-SN9Q] (italics in original). The Texas Department of Public Safety 
likewise asserted that stored license plate reader data “will enable various forms of crime analysis; 
for example, DPS will be able to trace the movements of felony vehicles over time (in hindsight) 
that travel specific routes from the border on a regular basis and help determine patterned 
movements associated with drugs/money/human trafficking.” TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE COLLECTION, STORAGE, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF 
AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER DATA 3, 26 (2014), https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/ 
administration/crime_records/pages/LPRPIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QA4-PNZT]. 
240. See, e.g., JENNIFER KING, DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN & STEVEN RAPHAEL, U.C. BERKELEY 
CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. IN THE INTEREST OF SOC’Y, REPORT: THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY 
SAFETY CAMERA PROGRAM—AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAN FRANCISCO’S 
COMMUNITY SAFETY CAMERAS 11–12 (2008); The Effect of CCTV on Public Safety: Research 
Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/ 
government/criminal-justice/surveillance-cameras-and-crime [https://perma.cc/VLV9-GSRW] 
(canvassing scholarly evaluations of the deterrent effect of surveillance cameras in public places).  
241. KING ET AL., supra note 238, at 11–12. 
242. Id. 
243. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013). But 
see Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to 
Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 265, 269 (2013) (criticizing Richards’s 
approach as “too narrow” and contending that the real danger comes not just from diminishing the 
zone of intellectual privacy but from surveillance of many different types of activities where that 
surveillance is “broad, indiscriminate, and continuous”). See also David Gray & Danielle Citron, 
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) (elaborating on their theory that it is 
the quantity of data that is collected that causes harm); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) (exploring the importance of intellectual privacy as a precondition for free 
expression).  
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contends that it can skew the balance of power between those engaged in 
surveillance and their targets, increasing the risk that targets will be 
subjected to “discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective 
enforcement.”244 Focusing in on a narrower aspect of surveillance, 
Katherine J. Strandburg has emphasized the way surveillance of 
relationships, particularly emergent relationships formed online, 
threatens First Amendment-protected associational activity.245 
Practitioners have identified similar harms. For example, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police stated, “the risk is that 
individuals will become more cautious in the exercise of their protected 
rights of expression, protest, association, and political participation 
because they consider themselves under constant surveillance.”246 
Surveillance technology may go beyond deterring conduct that is 
unlawful and inhibit or deter the legal and beneficial activities that 
citizens conduct in a free society. 
The possibility that people will be targeted because of their political 
or religious beliefs is not merely theoretical.247 In the mid-2000s, for 
                                                     
244. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 243, at 1935. 
245. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2008) (“First Amendment freedom 
of association guarantees must provide an additional check, distinct from the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections from unreasonable search and seizure, on overreaching relational surveillance 
potential.”). Other scholars have also articulated the harm to First Amendment-protected activities 
that surveillance can cause. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 114 (2007) (“First Amendment activities are implicated by a 
wide array of law enforcement data-gathering activities.”). More broadly, theories of privacy harm 
abound in legal scholarship. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of 
Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2015) (contending that privacy harm results when 
previously obscure information becomes readily accessible); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-
World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113 (2015) (asserting that privacy harm occurs when new 
technologies divulge information that was private previously, and that individuals react by 
modifying their behavior to achieve the prior level of disclosure); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 143 (2004) (positing that “a privacy violation has 
occurred when either contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of flow have been breached”); 
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 281, 299–303 (2011) (identifying myriad harms that mass surveillance can cause, including 
the likelihood of false positives, a greater risk of discrimination and profiling, and more potential for 
police corruption). 
246. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE 
UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 13 (2009), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_ 
Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YXW-EYPG]. 
247. In addition to the recent examples discussed in the accompanying text, there are historical 
examples as well. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 
787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986) involved a challenge to various surveillance and investigative practices 
directed at political organizations by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the 1970s. 
The case was settled with a consent decree entered in 1985 in which the NYPD was prohibited from 
investigating political and religious organizations and groups unless there was “specific 
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example, the Maryland State Police engaged in surveillance of political 
groups ranging from Amnesty International to advocates of bike lanes, a 
practice the governor condemned as “undemocratic” and that the 
Maryland State Police later acknowledged was a mistake.248 Human 
rights advocates and civil liberties groups criticized the New York Police 
Department’s extensive surveillance of political protestors during 
Occupy Wall Street.249 In Birmingham, United Kingdom, law 
enforcement agents installed a network of 200 cameras in predominantly 
Muslim communities on the pretense that it was a crime prevention 
measure.250 When members of the public discovered that the cameras 
were actually part of a covert anti-terrorism initiative, many expressed 
concerns about discriminatory targeting based on religion.251 
In addition to harms that result from official policy or practice, there 
is always the possibility of abusive use of surveillance equipment by 
individual officers for their own reasons. There are numerous examples 
of police officers using department GPS devices to track the vehicles of 
ex-girlfriends.252 Access to databases can also be abused. In 
Minneapolis, a female police officer obtained a $1 million settlement 
                                                     
information” that the group was linked to a crime that had been committed or was about to be 
committed. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–21. Another example is the Church Committee 
revelations. In 1975, the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, held a series of 
hearings and published fourteen reports as it investigated intelligence operations by the CIA, NSA, 
and FBI, including attempts to assassinate foreign leaders, spying on Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
monitoring the political activities of other U.S. citizens. See generally S. REP. NO. 94-755, at pt. 3 
(1976). 
248. Lisa Rein & Josh White, More Groups Than Thought Monitored in Police Spying, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 9, 2009, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/03/ 
ST2009010302013.html [https://perma.cc/D66Z-EJYT].  
249. See, e.g., THE GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW) & THE WALTER LEITNER INT’L 
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT THE LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW AND JUSTICE (FORDHAM LAW SCH.), 
SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO OCCUPY WALL 
STREET 93–98 (2012), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/suppressingprotest.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KPV6-BB2X].  
250. See Pete Fussey & Jon Coaffee, Urban Spaces of Surveillance, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 201, 207 (Kirstie Ball et al. eds., 2012); Paul Lewis, CCTV Aimed at 
Muslim Areas in Birmingham to be Dismantled, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/25/birmingham-cctv-muslim-areas-surveillance 
[https://perma.cc/WSZ5-Q58S].  
251. See Paul L. Lewis, Surveillance Cameras Spring Up in Muslim Areas–the Targets? 
Terrorists, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/04/ 
birmingham-surveillance-cameras-muslim-community [https://perma.cc/CA2E-8NA5]. 
252. See, e.g., Robert J. Lopez, Officer Accused of Hiding GPS Device in Woman’s Car, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/04/costa-mesa-
police.html [https://perma.cc/J4MA-WR3P]. 
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after more than 400 of her colleagues accessed her driver’s license 
record out of pure voyeurism.253 
There is no single solution to whether and how a particular 
surveillance technology should be deployed. A high-crime community 
might tolerate more surveillance than a low-crime community. A 
community with a strong civil libertarian streak might prefer to face a 
greater safety risk than to restrict civil liberties. A community such as 
Oakland, which holds its police department in low regard, might be less 
willing than other communities to entrust its police department with 
potentially invasive surveillance technology.254 
However, every data collection scheme implicates the same questions 
about data collection, retention, use, and sharing. What data should be 
collected? How long should the data that is collected be stored? What 
uses of stored data should be allowed? With whom should data be shared 
and on what terms? The importance of these basic questions to any data 
management scheme is broadly recognized.255 For example, they are at 
the heart of the Fair Information Practices, “a set of internationally 
recognized practices for addressing the privacy of information about 
individuals.”256 They also form the core of the Privacy Act, which 
controls the collection, retention, use, and sharing of information about 
                                                     
253. Kim Zetter, Female Cop Gets $1 Million After Colleagues Trolled Database to Peek at Her 
Pic, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/payout-for-cop-database-
abuse/ [https://perma.cc/FAZ7-T4KG]. 
254. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1259–60 (2004) (“There are varying local preferences about the balance 
between individual liberties and actions government might take to increase the physical security of 
its citizens. There is also variation in how much local citizens desire to exercise a particular liberty 
and how serious the threat to physical safety in their area is.”). 
255. See generally ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 
(2015), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/E538-X9QU]. The Fair 
Information Practices include additional elements, but some of them are a poor fit for the law 
enforcement context. For example, they state that data “should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.” OECD Privacy 
Principles, OECD, http://oecdprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/4AYY-PX7X] (emphasis added). 
Needless to say, the government’s interest in enforcing the criminal code would often be frustrated 
by requiring the government to obtain an investigative target’s consent. Also, some scholars use 
slightly different labels to capture the core data management concepts, or break them down into 
more or fewer elements. Compare Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative 
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1112 (2016) (referencing “collection, access, sharing, 
retention, and use”) with Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (discussing “collection, use, and disclosure”). This 
does not appear to be a disagreement about what elements are important. Rather, the term “use” is 
sufficiently broad that it can include the concepts of retention and access. How granularly to break 
down the core data management concepts depends on an author’s purpose. 
256. GELLMAN, supra note 255, at 1. 
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individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal 
agencies.257 Thus, while surveillance policy outcomes may vary from 
community to community, the process by which surveillance policy is 
set should always involve consideration of the same factors. Yet in all 
three case studies, the federal government’s decision to fund surveillance 
technology without requiring or encouraging adoption of a use policy 
had the practical result of no such use policy being promulgated. This in 
turn suggests that there is a structural flaw in how we are setting 
surveillance policy in this context. 
B. Accountability and Levels of Government 
In the case studies, the fact that the federal government funded 
acquisition of surveillance technology but was silent on protections for 
civil rights and liberties created genuine confusion over which elected 
officials bore ultimate responsibility for how such technology would be 
used. This observation is important because the primary reason the 
United States Supreme Court has privileged spending programs over 
initiatives that “commandeer” sub-federal officials is because of its 
assessment that spending programs do a better job of preserving clear 
lines of accountability. The case studies cast doubt on whether this is 
descriptively accurate, reinforcing existing scholarship that has made 
this point in other contexts or in more abstract terms. 
The Supreme Court has held that the structural protections of the 
Constitution forbid Congress from commandeering sub-federal officials. 
The prohibition is absolute: “[t]he Federal Government may neither 
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”258 By contrast, 
Congress enjoys wide latitude to influence state and local actions by 
placing conditions on grants-in-aid to states. It can spend money in any 
area that promotes the general welfare, subject to a small number of 
modest restrictions: conditions on grants must be unambiguous, related 
to the federal interest in a national project or program, and must not 
induce the states to act unconstitutionally.259 Moreover, these programs 
must not cross the “point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”260 
                                                     
257. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); see also id. §§ 552a(e)(1)–(2) (imposing 
limitations on data collection, retention, and use); § 552a(b) (imposing limitations on data sharing).  
258. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
259. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
260. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
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Until its recent ruling invalidating a portion of the Affordable Care Act, 
the Court had never determined that a federal grant was impermissibly 
coercive.261 
According to the Court, conditional spending is preferable to 
commandeering because spending programs preserve local political 
processes: “the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to 
whether or not the State will comply.”262 Thus, “[i]f a state’s citizens 
view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may 
elect to decline a federal grant.”263 This, in turn, promotes 
accountability: “[w]here Congress encourages state regulation rather 
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local 
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the 
people.”264 By contrast, “where the Federal Government directs the 
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory 
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their 
decision.”265 
Some scholars have criticized the Court’s accountability-based 
distinction between commandeering and spending, suggesting that if 
obscuring accountability is a problem, it “seems to condemn not merely 
federal laws that commandeer state or local services but also even 
voluntary intergovernmental cooperation.”266 Others dispute that 
                                                     
261. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first 
time ever—finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive.” (emphasis 
in original)). For a discussion of the impact of National Federation of Independent Business on the 
federal government’s spending power, see generally Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power After 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2014). 
262. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
263. Id. 
264. Id.; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Permitting the Federal 
Government to force the states to implement a federal program would threaten the political 
accountability key to our federal system.”); id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress effectively 
engages in this impermissible compulsion when state participation in a federal spending program is 
coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a federal regulatory program is 
rendered illusory.”). 
265. New York, 505 U.S. at 169. Some scholars question whether commandeering poses 
accountability problems. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A 
Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2006) (“[I]t seems likely that citizens who 
pay attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able to discern which level of 
government is responsible for a government regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may 
be largely beyond judicial or political help on the accountability front.”). 
266. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 826 (1998) 
(emphasis in original); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
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spending programs can create meaningful accountability problems.267 
The case studies provide reason to side with the former group. Putting 
doctrine to the side for a moment, it is worth thinking through who was 
responsible for surveillance policy in the case studies. The federal 
government allocated millions of dollars for surveillance equipment 
acquisition but did not require anyone to think through key questions of 
data management. Local law enforcement agencies took the money, but 
also did not devise a data management plan. Local elected officials 
signed off formally, but with no or only a dim understanding of what the 
law enforcement agency it supervised was acquiring. 
Which elected officials are to blame for the fact that no one thought 
through basic questions of data collection, retention, use, and sharing? 
Federal officials, because the federal government appropriated the 
money and designed the procedures through which localities could elect 
to participate?268 Local elected officials, because they signed off on 
acquisition of the technologies? Both? Neither?269 
                                                     
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201–03 (1998) (pointing out that conditional 
spending programs can also be confusing for voters); Siegel, supra note 265, at 1681 (“Nor is it 
apparent generally that commandeering generates insurmountable accountability concerns, or that 
preemption, conditional non-preemption, and conditional federal spending avoid similar 
accountability problems.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the 
Problem of Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 482, 483 (1995) 
(“Federal spending conditions tend to diffuse responsibility between Washington and the states, 
leaving the political system less monitorable and accountable than it should be.”); Rebecca E. 
Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 141, 190 (2002) (“The reason for the anti-commandeering rule was the Court’s fear 
that commandeering state officials would cause a lack of accountability and confuse state 
voters . . . . Yet conditional funding arguably creates the same concern about accountability since 
states agree to comply with conditions beyond their control in order to receive federal funds.”).  
267. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 880 (2013) (questioning whether spending programs blur accountability to any 
meaningful degree); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 920 (2008) 
(“Standing alone this voter-confusion story is not very persuasive. It may be true that voters will in 
part blame their local officials for the results of conditional grants, but that is not confusion at all. It 
takes two to contract, and local officials who make bad deals should be held to account for them, 
whether those deals are with trash-collection contractors or Congress.”). 
268. Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 
1565 (2015) (“In every program and for every grant that relies on the states’ voluntary participation, 
the federal government decides how the states volunteer: which official or institution gets to speak 
for the state, how the decision is presented to that speaker, what process the speaker must use to 
communicate the state’s decision, and the timeline on which the decision must be made.”). 
269. Role confusion is not without historical precedent. When the Church Committee examined 
intelligence abuses that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, it concluded that the FBI dodged 
criticism for deployment of controversial intelligence collection techniques by relying on local 
police departments to do so. Waxman, supra note 10, at 298–99. 
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The Supreme Court rejected commandeering because it makes it 
difficult to know which elected officials are responsible for a policy 
decision. The federal programs in the case studies are spending 
programs, but all of the Supreme Court’s concerns about accountability 
are present in this context as well. It was Congress that created the Port 
Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative, not local 
representatives. Congress made the decision to allocate money for 
surveillance equipment acquisition without requiring anyone to think 
through data management. The consequences of these programs were 
specific and local: the acquisition of surveillance technology by local 
police departments to be used to engage in surveillance of local 
populations. Naturally, public ire targeted these departments’ respective 
city councils. And this anger was appropriate, given that these bodies 
could have insisted on the formulation of policies but did not insist. But 
federal elected representatives also could have insisted on the enactment 
of policies; however, this inaction at the federal level has not been met 
with similarly widespread public criticism. 
The case studies cast doubt on whether the distinction the Court has 
drawn between programs that commandeer and conditional spending 
programs furthers its objective. And while the Court’s concern appears 
to be whether the public can discern which political actors are 
responsible for which decisions, there may be a deeper problem. It may 
be that there is no good answer to who ought to be held responsible for a 
policy choice.270 In the case studies, the matter is genuinely unclear. 
Probably the best answer is that both federal and local officials should 
shoulder a portion of the blame—local officials for not attending to a 
matter traditionally under local control, and federal officials for 
intervening in such a matter without attending to all of the consequences 
of their actions. 
C. Accountability and Policy Arenas 
The case studies also highlight the possible collateral consequences of 
federal national security initiatives on local policing. Some have argued 
that the federal government must take a stronger hand at the local level if 
it is to successfully prevent and respond to acts of terrorism.271 But given 
                                                     
270. Perversely, it may be that federal spending programs that permit the maximum amount of 
local flexibility and choice in implementation also foment the most serious difficulties in 
determining who is responsible for policy choices. See Hills, supra note 266, at 827–28 (discussing 
Martha A. Derthick’s classic study of the operation of public assistance programs in Massachusetts). 
271. See supra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
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the substantial overlap between the equipment and techniques used to 
combat terrorism and those used to carry out routine law enforcement 
functions, anti-terrorism initiatives are likely to have substantial 
spillover effects on routine policing. This suggests that any cost-benefit 
analysis of federal national security initiatives that incorporate local law 
enforcement agencies ought to account for these initiatives’ impact on 
policing, including the transparency of police practices and the 
accountability of police for their actions, not just what they contribute to 
federal national security priorities. 
Both policy makers and scholars have contended that the federal 
government must become more involved at the local level to advance the 
War on Terror. Most famously, the 9/11 Commission concluded that 
“[t]here is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies,” 
but cautioned that “[t]hey need more training and work with federal 
agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal 
authorities in identifying terrorist suspects.”272 Some scholars have also 
endorsed this view,273 articulating more specifically the areas in which 
                                                     
272. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
390 (2004), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLJ-ZL5G]; see 
also PETER NEUMANN, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN 
AMERICA, 43–45 (2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/ 
NSPG.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR9C-9BWY] (criticizing federal efforts to catalyze local involvement 
in terrorism prevention as ineffectual); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: 
American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 377, 377 (2009) (identifying calls by federal officials for greater federal-local collaboration 
to prevent, investigate, and respond to terrorism). 
273. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM 155–56 (2007) (“MI5 has been 
able to do what the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have been unable to do—
integrate local police into the national domestic intelligence system. It is a vital mission. Local 
police, border patrol, customs officers, and private security and intelligence personnel gather 
enormous masses of information at the source, as it were. They are well positioned to notice 
anomalies that may be clues to terrorist plotting. We need an agency that will integrate local police 
and other information gatherers into a comprehensive national intelligence network, as MI5 has 
done in Britain.”); Lindsey Garber, Have We Learned a Lesson? The Boston Marathon Bombings 
and Information Sharing, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 238–44 (2015) (discussing the importance of 
state and local involvement to terrorism prevention measures); Steven R. Morrison, The System of 
Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 341, 375 (2014) (“Over 
time, it became apparent that expansive terrorist structures, instantiated in the spread of ideology 
rather than institutional structure and the encouragement of lone wolf, homegrown operators rather 
than cells connected to a center, required a mirroring law enforcement response. That response 
includes calls for more local responses, is coded as traditional law enforcement, and is a relatively 
novel approach”); Mitch Silber & Adam Frey, Detect, Disrupt, and Detain: Local Law 
Enforcement’s Critical Roles in Combating Homegrown Extremism and the Evolving Terrorist 
Threat, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127, 145 (2013) (“Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has 
become clear that local police departments have a role to play in the counterterrorism fight.”); 
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2160 (2002) (“Local police 
have already been affected by the terrorist attacks, and powerfully so. The FBI may have primary 
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collaboration is likely to be fruitful,274 and identifying challenges that 
are likely to arise.275 
One such challenge is the inherent inseparability of initiatives to 
combat terrorism from routine law enforcement functions. For example, 
as Samuel J. Rascoff has pointed out, it is precisely because local police 
officers develop rich and trusting relationships with local residents 
through routine policing that they are also well positioned to pick up 
information about possible terrorist threats.276 This capacity for 
intelligence gathering presents an opportunity, but pursuing this aspect 
of the job too aggressively may undermine community relationships that 
are necessary to maintaining public safety and order.277 
The entwinement of national security and law enforcement functions 
may be particularly acute when it comes to surveillance equipment. An 
automatic license plate reader can be used to determine whether a 
vehicle is registered to someone with an outstanding felony arrest 
warrant, or it can be used to determine whether the vehicle is registered 
to someone whose name is on a terrorist watch list. Stingrays, devices 
used to pinpoint the geographic location of cell phones, can be used to 
identify the locations of cell phone-carrying drug dealers, or they can be 
used to identify the locations of cell phone-enabled improvised 
explosive devices. Moreover, because terrorism is exceedingly rare 
compared to other forms of crime, a particular piece of surveillance 
equipment is vastly more likely to have an impact on criminal law 
enforcement than it is to have an impact on terrorism-related 
investigations.278 This impact may be magnified given that local law 
                                                     
responsibility for investigating allegations, but that agency lacks the manpower to guard public 
places. Local police must do so.”); Waxman, supra note 10, at 346–47 (contending that “many 
aspects of counterterrorism intelligence will require centralized federal control and high degrees of 
uniformity—even if they also necessarily involve coordination with local agencies”). 
274. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1715, 1721 (2010) (advocating for “the creation of new federal-local collaborative structures that 
will simultaneously enhance the analytic rigor and the legal oversight of local intelligence while 
leaving undisturbed and exploiting to full effect the advantages that local intelligence possesses”). 
275. Waxman, supra note 272, at 378 (explaining that the article “examines three national 
security law challenges resulting from greater involvement of state and local police agencies in 
protecting national security, especially in combating terrorism”). 
276. Rascoff, supra note 274, at 1731–35. 
277. Id. at 1738 (“This balanced portfolio—and the fact that local police are inevitably ‘repeat 
players’ in the communities in which they operate—does, in fact, create powerful incentives for 
police officers to negotiate a middle road when it comes to the more intrusive and potentially 
objectionable aspects of counterterrorism.”). 
278. This point is probably intuitive, but there is also some scattered empirical evidence to 
support it. For example, in February 2013, the Tacoma, Washington, City Council accepted some 
$190,000 in funds from the federal Port Security Grant Program to purchase an update to an 
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enforcement agencies have more experience and knowledge about 
routine criminal law enforcement than combatting terrorism and may 
therefore be more readily positioned to envision creative uses of 
surveillance equipment for law enforcement purposes. 
The Seattle and Oakland case studies provide further support for the 
idea that, although the purpose of a federal program may be to combat 
terrorism, its effects may fall mostly on policing. (The San Diego case 
study does not fit this mold because the federal program that funded it 
was targeted at law enforcement practices.) Seattle paid for its drone 
using funds from the Urban Areas Security Initiative, a program to help 
urban areas prevent and recover from acts of terrorism.279 Seattle did not 
have the opportunity to use its drone, but its plans for the drone’s 
deployment stretched beyond terrorism to include documenting traffic 
accident scenes and searching for missing persons.280 Seattle funded its 
wireless mesh network through the Port Security Grant Program, which 
is designed to help mitigate the risk that terrorists will exploit security 
                                                     
unnamed device, the purpose of which was “to assist in the prevention, detection, response, and 
recovery of improvised explosive devices.” TACOMA CITY COUNCIL, MINUTES 1–2 (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://cityoftacoma.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=331085&GUID=2FD1B1C7-F7BD-
4CED-87FD-2E7EB10DCA60 [https://perma.cc/65GZ-T32F]. Subsequent reporting by the Tacoma 
News Tribune revealed that the device was a stingray. See Kate Martin, Tacoma Police Using 
Surveillance Device to Sweep Up Cellphone Data, NEWS TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article25878184.html [https://perma.cc/LS8X-KDD4]. 
A privacy advocate’s public records act request demonstrated that while the device had been used 
168 times to investigate crimes from murder to assault to theft of a city laptop, not once had it been 
used to detect an improvised explosive device. TACOMA POLICE DEP’T, RESPONSE TO PUBLIC 
RECORDS ACT REQUEST OF PHIL MOCEK, https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/ 
partial_response.pdf [https://perma.cc/K295-BVQV]. Automatic license plate readers provide 
another example. In 2012, in a previous career as a staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties 
Union, I worked with colleagues to file a public records act request with the Maryland fusion center 
to obtain data on its use of automatic license plate readers. See ACLU, supra note 164 (describing 
multi-state public records act initiative to uncover use of automatic license plate readers). The data 
showed that between January and May of 2012, the fusion center collected about 35 million plate 
reads. MARYLAND STATE POLICE, PUBLIC RECORDS ACT RESPONSE (2012), https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/maryland/alprpra_msp_md%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/A6TK-RX6J]. Of 
these, 59 reads were of cars registered to individuals listed on a violent gang or terrorist 
organization watch list. See id. (that figure does not mean that these cars were actually driven by 
gang members or terrorists; it just means that a person associated with the car had been placed on a 
government watch list). By contrast, some 90,000 were associated with individuals driving on 
suspended or revoked licenses, or who had not complied with the vehicle emissions program. See 
id. The overwhelming majority pertained to the movements of vehicles whose owners were not 
suspected of anything at all. See id. 
279. See supra Part II. 
280. Christine Clarridge, supra note 58 (discussing traffic investigations); SEATTLE POLICE 
DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 39, at 5.  
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vulnerabilities at ports.281 The mesh network would have had important 
functions in an emergency, such as ensuring that first responders could 
continue to communicate with one another even if the cellular network 
became overloaded.282 The mesh network facilitated the city’s placement 
of surveillance cameras in downtown Seattle, cameras that were to have 
been used for routine law enforcement purposes.283 The Port Security 
Grant Program also funded Oakland’s DAC. Given that the purpose of 
the DAC was to improve port security by gaining a better understanding 
of events in Oakland through establishment of a citywide surveillance 
center, it, too, would have had a substantial impact on routine law 
enforcement. 
It is also worth asking whether the disconnect between the federal 
government’s objectives in funding the technologies and the local law 
enforcement agencies’ objectives in acquiring them contributed to the 
failure of the Seattle and Oakland programs—and whether the identity of 
interests of the federal government’s funding program and ARJIS’s 
objectives was a factor in the success of ARJIS’s facial recognition 
technology. The record is clear that Oakland tailored its proposal to 
create a DAC around federal funding requirements, and although there is 
inadequate information to draw this conclusion about Seattle’s 
programs, it is a possibility. In San Diego, the obvious match, in interest 
and expertise, between the DOJ funding program and ARJIS may have 
contributed to the program being well-targeted at a pressing local law 
enforcement need. 
These programs are not the only documented examples where federal 
initiatives created to combat terrorism by harnessing sub-federal law 
enforcement agencies have had substantial spillover effects on law 
enforcement practices. After 9/11, the federal government directed 
considerable resources toward expanding the nation’s network of fusion 
centers, state and local government entities designed to enhance 
information sharing and analysis.284 These centers have prioritized state 
and local objectives over federal goals.285 
                                                     
281. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-47, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM: 
RISK MODEL, GRANT MANAGEMENT & EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES COULD BE STRENGTHENED 1 
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT2P-NM76]. 
282. See supra section II.A.2. 
283. See supra section II.A.2. 
284. Jason Barnosky, Fusion Centers: What’s Working and What Isn’t, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
(Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/03/17/fusion-centers-whats-working-
and-what-isnt/ [https://perma.cc/646S-D4V8]. 
285. See id. 
08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:52 PM 
2016] SURVEILLANCE POLICY MAKING BY PROCUREMENT 1655 
 
The observation that federal anti-terrorism programs have spillover 
effects on routine law enforcement functions matters because 
effectiveness of government programs ought to be evaluated in light of 
all of their consequences. When federal programs provide funding to 
sub-federal law enforcement agencies, any such evaluation should 
account for not only their impact on the federal government’s national 
security agenda, but also the impact on local policing. Additionally, 
impact on local policing should be gauged in a holistic manner, 
accounting for both benefits to public safety and costs to civil liberties, 
as well as consequences on accountability and transparency of 
policing.286 
IV. REMEDIES TO DEMOCRATIZE LOCAL SURVEILLANCE 
POLICY MAKING 
The preceding Parts demonstrate that the federal government fails to 
ensure that local elected officials and members of the public are 
involved in decisions about surveillance technology acquisition, or that 
anyone develops a policy to govern this technology’s use.287 They also 
show that this failure can lead local law enforcement agencies to adopt 
surveillance technologies that are out of step with local preferences.288 
They further suggest that local input can play a valuable role in ensuring 
that surveillance policy is consistent with local crime rates, the 
competence and trustworthiness of the police department, and local 
political preferences.289 Finally, the preceding Parts contend that while 
different communities may reasonably decide to engage in greater or 
lesser amounts of surveillance, all surveillance technology deployments 
should be governed by policies addressing data collection, retention, use, 
and sharing.290 
Building off of this descriptive and normative account, this Part offers 
proposals for how to increase local democratic control of surveillance 
policy and ensure that this policy addresses key data management issues. 
Reform options include steps that elected representatives could take at 
the federal, state, and local levels. The menu of reform options works to 
                                                     
286. Rachel A. Harmon makes a broadly similar point in arguing that federal public safety 
programs should be evaluated in a way that accounts for the nonmonetary costs of policing, 
including the costs of coercion. See Harmon, supra note 8.  
287. See supra Part I. 
288. See supra Part II. 
289. See supra Part II. 
290. See supra section III.A. 
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capture all policy solutions that could work as a theoretical matter while 
acknowledging that some are more politically feasible than others. 
A. Federal Remedies 
If part of the problem is that the federal government does not require 
local elected representatives and members of the public to be involved in 
decisions about what technologies law enforcement agencies acquire and 
does not require anyone to develop use policies, then one possibility is 
for the federal government to condition receipt of funding on completion 
of these steps. A federal solution has particular appeal because only the 
federal government could devise a remedy that would apply 
comprehensively. 
1. Require Involvement of Elected Representatives in Decisions About 
Technology Acquisition 
There is nothing to stop the federal government from requiring that 
local elected officials be involved in decisions about what surveillance 
technologies local police departments acquire with federal money. As 
discussed previously, the federal government has sweeping power to 
place conditions on grants-in-aid.291 Federal programs routinely 
designate which state or local actors must elect to participate in other 
federal programs.292 To be sure, the case studies provide reason to doubt 
that incorporating elected officials into the decision-making process, 
without additional measures, will achieve meaningful oversight. But the 
opportunity to weigh in is still a necessary precondition to such 
oversight, and it is one local elected officials should be provided. 
There are difficult and uncertain questions about how best to structure 
the involvement of local elected representatives. One such question 
pertains to timing. The sooner local elected officials become involved in 
decisions regarding surveillance technology acquisition, the greater the 
influence they will have over local surveillance policy. If local elected 
officials were required to sign off on grant applications prior to 
submission, then in theory it would not be too late for them to suggest 
acquisition of different technologies (e.g., a red light camera instead of a 
surveillance camera) or abandonment of the application altogether. By 
the time the federal government has funded a specific grant proposal and 
local elected officials face an up-or-down vote on whether to take the 
                                                     
291. See supra section III.B. 
292. Fahey, supra note 268, at 1573–75. 
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money, there is not the same opportunity for creative input. Also, cash-
strapped municipalities may be reluctant to reject free equipment, even if 
it is not the best match for local circumstances. 
The case studies do not shed light on how pre-application 
involvement would work out in practice because in no case did local law 
enforcement agents seek such approval.293 The fact that SANDAG’s 
reform measures included Board review of grant applications prior to 
submission suggests that at least some local governing bodies would 
desire such authority.294 
2. Require Meaningful Disclosure of Information to Elected 
Representatives 
In addition to requiring that local elected officials have an early 
opportunity to weigh in on surveillance technology acquisition, the 
federal government could also mandate that local elected officials 
receive a written assessment of the impact of the surveillance technology 
at issue.295 This assessment could encompass not only the benefits to 
public safety, but also the consequences for civil rights and liberties, 
especially (given the nature of surveillance technology) for privacy. 
However, assessments will only help when lack of information, rather 
than inadequate comprehension or interest, impedes participation by 
local elected representatives. 
The federal government itself produces a couple of helpful models for 
how this could work in practice. The first, a privacy impact assessment, 
is a formalized “analysis of how personally identifiable information is 
collected, retained, used, [and] shared.”296 The E-Government Act of 
                                                     
293. Oakland city staff did provide the city council with an informational report about its plan to 
seek a grant before the grant application deadline, but it did not seek council approval. See supra 
section II.B. 
294. SANDAG set up streamlined protocols for time-sensitive grant applications. See SAN DIEGO 
ASS’N OF GOV’TS, supra note 213. 
295. Thanks to Deirdre K. Mulligan for this suggestion. In 2006, Mulligan recommended that the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security require potential recipients of DHS grants for video 
surveillance systems to conduct a privacy impact assessment. Prepared Statement of Deirdre K. 
Mulligan before the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory 
Committee 2 (June 7, 2006), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Mulligan_DHS_Statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PDD7-3QT2]. 
296. Privacy Impact Assessments, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/ 
privacy-policy/privacy-impact-assessments [https://perma.cc/37H4-SULA]. For a detailed 
consideration of the challenges of using privacy impact assessments to get government agencies to 
consider privacy in addition to their primary objectives, see generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & 
Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy Decision-Making in U.S. Government 
 
08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:52 PM 
1658 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1595 
 
2002 requires all federal agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments 
“for all new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains 
or disseminates personally identifiable information.”297 Among other 
things, privacy impact assessments must “contain a risk assessment that 
specifically identifies and evaluates potential threats to individual 
privacy, discusses alternatives and identifies the appropriate risk 
mitigation measures for each.”298 The second, pioneered by the DHS 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, is the civil rights and civil 
liberties impact assessment.299 As the name suggests, this assessment 
covers a broader range of rights and liberties than a privacy impact 
assessment, but the general idea is the same. 
To be sure, assessments will not be a cure-all. However, they would 
likely be an improvement on the status quo. If the federal government 
required local law enforcement agencies to conduct an assessment of any 
surveillance technology they wish to acquire using federal funds, it 
would help to ensure that these agencies thought through the impact of 
surveillance technologies on protected rights and liberties. The 
requirement to produce an assessment could be coupled with a mandate 
that the assessment be made available to the public and provided to local 
elected officials.300 In that case, the assessment would also raise public 
awareness about a local law enforcement agency’s surveillance plans 
and aid local elected representatives in weighing in on surveillance 
technology acquisition in an informed manner. 
3. Require that Surveillance Technologies Be Governed by Use 
Policies 
Finally, the federal government could require that all federally funded 
surveillance technology be governed by a data management protocol that 
addresses the fundamental questions of data collection, retention, use, 
and sharing. Ideally, draft protocols would be shared with 
representatives at the same time as the assessment described above, and 
                                                     
Agencies, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 225, 225–74 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 
2012). 
297. Privacy Impact Assessments, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://archives.gov/privacy/privacy-impact-
assessments/index.html [https://perma.cc/P84U-U2U4]. 
298. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 295, at 228. 
299. Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND  
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments [https://perma.cc/DMW4-
TYKS]. 
300. Some federal programs already require that states take steps to publicize, and even obtain 
comment, on applications for grant funds. Fahey, supra note 266, at 1578. 
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would be approved by local elected representatives prior to deployment. 
The federal government already requires federally funded fusion centers 
to have privacy policies.301 There is no reason that other programs that 
fund surveillance could not do the same. 
* * * 
The combination of early notice to elected representatives and 
meaningful provision of information to them, in the form of assessments 
and draft data management protocols, is consistent with scholarship 
suggesting that enhanced accountability through external oversight can 
help advance agencies’ secondary goals.302 While this model still 
depends on external oversight being conducted vigorously and 
thoughtfully, these reforms should lead to greater consideration of 
privacy and other civil liberties and rights than is currently the case. 
B. State Remedies 
States could also adopt the reform measures advocated in the 
preceding section. While states generally delegate policing policy to 
local governments, they are free to take on this topic themselves. 
Relying on every state to pass legislation is unlikely to result in a 
remedy as comprehensive in scope as a federal-level solution, but there 
may be more political willpower to tackle surveillance policy making by 
procurement at the state level. 
In recent years, states have been remarkably active in passing 
legislation limiting law enforcement agencies’ use of surveillance 
technologies.303 In the aftermath of the heavily militarized response to 
                                                     
301. Barnosky, supra note 284. 
302. See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 295, at 248. 
303. For example, in 2015, California passed a comprehensive law, the California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, requiring warrants for digital records of emails, texts, and 
geolocation information, even when the data is stored in the cloud by service providers. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1546–1546.4 (West 2016). Virginia enacted legislation requiring law enforcement agencies 
to obtain a warrant (except in limited circumstances) before employing a drone. VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 19.2–60.1 (2015). North Carolina adopted a bill that requires state and local agencies employing 
license plate readers to adopt a written use policy and sets limitations on data retention without a 
warrant. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-183.22–24 (2015). For a useful compilation of state legislation 
regarding drones (both pertaining to law enforcement use and otherwise), see Current Unmanned 
Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9J23-VN82] (thirty-two states have enacted laws and five have passed 
resolutions). For a similar compilation for ALPR legislation, see Automated License Plate Readers: 
State Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2014-state-legislation-related-to-
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protesters in Ferguson, states have also considered (and New Jersey has 
passed) legislation requiring local government approval when police 
departments seek to obtain surplus military equipment.304 Surveillance 
policy making by procurement resides at the intersection of these two 
issues and should therefore be of interest to state legislatures as well. 
Reforms enacted on the state level would not provide as 
comprehensive a remedy as federal reforms because they would only go 
into effect in those states that adopted them. However, they would 
address more instances of surveillance policy making by procurement 
than would relying on each local government to enact its own legislative 
fix. Moreover, as Richard Briffault has pointed out, states have “greater 
resources and greater ability to mobilize public attention that comes 
from their relatively greater size and fewer numbers.”305 California’s 
passage of a data breach notification statute, requiring businesses and 
agencies to provide notice to California customers whose personal 
information is subject to a data breach, led forty-six states to pass similar 
laws.306 Action in one prominent state or a handful of states on 
surveillance policy making by procurement could lead to a similar 
snowball effect. 
C. Local Remedies 
Local elected representatives have the most straightforward remedy 
available to them: they can require that local police departments draft 
impact assessments and data management protocols and present these 
items for consideration and approval prior to applying for federal 
funding. Another option, at least for larger municipalities, is to 
institutionalize a privacy officer function and empower the privacy 
officer to oversee municipal data management practices. The 
disadvantage of depending on every local government to take one of 
                                                     
automated-license-plate-recognition-information.aspx [https://perma.cc/3746-6U2W] (in 2015 
alone, eighteen state legislatures considered ALPR bills, four of which enacted legislation). 
304. Jake Grovum, Can States Slow the Flow of Military Equipment to Police?, STATELINE (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/24/can-states-
slow-the-flow-of-military-equipment-to-police [https://perma.cc/N3Y8-6PSK]. 
305. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1349 (1994). 
306. Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging Corporate 
Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 232 (2011). 
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these steps is that many municipalities will lack the resources or interest 
to do so.307 
Seattle’s surveillance equipment ordinance came close to taking the 
steps this Article recommends.308 It has also inspired a few other 
communities to implement or consider similar measures. The Santa 
Clara County, California, Board of Supervisors recently passed an 
ordinance requiring officials wishing to deploy surveillance technology 
to provide an analysis of the privacy and due process impact of the 
technology, to obtain approval of a use policy prior to seeking funding 
for such technology, and to report annually on the use of the 
technology.309 As discussed earlier, Oakland is now at work on its own 
surveillance equipment ordinance.310 Although this is hardly a 
nationwide movement, prominent civil liberties groups have begun to 
throw their weight behind these ordinances, and they may yet spread.311 
Another possibility, at least in mid-sized or larger municipalities, is to 
create a privacy officer position with a portfolio that includes addressing 
surveillance policy making by procurement. As a general matter, a 
privacy officer’s job responsibilities include formulating and monitoring 
compliance with privacy policies, handling public requests for access to 
data as well as complaints, and serving as a general resource on privacy 
and other civil liberties issues.312 The DOJ urges all law enforcement 
agencies collecting personally identifiable information to ensure that 
someone within the department serves the function of a privacy 
officer.313 With respect to surveillance policy making by procurement, 
                                                     
307. As discussed in section III.A, while municipalities may reasonably differ on the substance of 
what surveillance policies they prefer, surveillance technology use should be governed by a data 
management protocol. 
308. See supra section II.A.2. 
309. SANTA CLARA CTY., CAL., ORDINANCE NS-300.897 (June 21, 2016). 
310. See supra section II.B.2.  
311. For example, the ACLU of California has developed a model ordinance to bring greater 
oversight and transparency to surveillance technology acquisition and deployment, suggesting that 
this organization will put resources behind seeing these types of ordinances adopted more widely. 
ACLU OF CAL., MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE 25–28 (2016), https://www. 
aclunc.org/docs/20160325-making_smart_decisions_about_surveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JZG 
-XNV7]. 
312. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE GLOBAL ADVISORY COMM., ESTABLISHING A PRIVACY OFFICER 
FUNCTION WITHIN A JUSTICE OR PUBLIC SAFETY ENTITY 1 (2014), https://it.ojp.gov/GIST/ 
165/File/Final-Privacy-Officer-Function-Brochure-6-17-140.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7K-3YDR]. 
313. Id. at 2. Currently, the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department appears to be the 
only police department in the nation with a designated, full-time privacy officer. See Angelique 
Carson, She’s Not a Cop, But She’s Their CPO, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 23, 2015), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/shes-not-a-cop-but-shes-their-cpo/ [https://perma.cc/4Z2F-C2KJ]. 
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the privacy officer could work with municipal agencies acquiring 
surveillance technology to develop impact assessments or data 
management protocols, which could then be sent to local elected 
representatives to approval. 
An advantage of the privacy officer model is that it gives a designated 
person both the time and incentive to develop expertise on privacy 
matters. A major disadvantage is cost: only a relatively small share of 
municipalities will be able to afford to fund such a position. This 
solution is probably most appropriate for municipalities that are 
interested in addressing privacy matters not just within law enforcement 
agencies, but across the board. Municipalities are under increasing 
pressure to make the data they collect more readily available (commonly 
known as municipal open data initiatives) and to collect more data to 
improve service provision (commonly known as “smart city” 
initiatives).314 A privacy officer might be worth the investment for cities 
embracing these initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
For good reason, federal programs that fund local law enforcement 
agencies’ acquisition of military-grade weapons and equipment have 
been the subject of considerable public concern and extensive scholarly 
analysis. Although their consequences are less visible, federal programs 
that fund acquisition of surveillance technology by these same agencies 
also merit our attention. Given the rapid pace of technological progress 
over the past two decades, it is understandable that our legal framework 
for disseminating and regulating surveillance technology is under-
developed. But now that technologies such as drones and license plate 
readers are both widely used and widely known, it is time for our system 
of governance to catch up. The policy proposals contained in this Article 
begin that work. 
 
                                                     
314. For an interesting and empirically-grounded discussion of municipal open data, particularly 
relevant to the topic of this Article because it also uses Seattle as a case study, see Jan Whittington 
et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899 (2015). While law review literature on the smart city is sparse (although 
not non-existent, see, e.g., Annie Decker, Smart Law for Smart Cities, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491 
(2014)), the idea has gained considerable traction and enthusiasm among policy makers. Most 
prominently, in 2015 the White House announced a $135 million “Smart Cities” initiative. See 
FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New “Smart Cities” Initiative to Help Communities 
Tackle Local Challenges and Improve City Services, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 14 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/14/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
smart-cities-initiative-help [https://perma.cc/28UK-CLDA]. 
